Essays on the Impact of Aid and Institutions on Income Inequality and Human Welfare by Khieu, Samphors
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Public Management and Policy Dissertations Department of Public Management and Policy
12-18-2013
Essays on the Impact of Aid and Institutions on
Income Inequality and Human Welfare
Samphors Khieu
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Public Management and Policy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Management and Policy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Khieu, Samphors, "Essays on the Impact of Aid and Institutions on Income Inequality and Human Welfare." Dissertation, Georgia
State University, 2013.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss/48
ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF AID AND INSTITUTIONS ON 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND HUMAN WELFARE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
The Academic Faculty 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Samphors Khieu 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia State University and Georgia Institute of Technology 
December 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
COPYRIGHT 2013 BY SAMPHORS KHIEU 
ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF AID AND INSTITUTIONS ON 
INCOME INEQUALITY AND HUMAN WELFARE 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
Approved by:   
   
Dr. Felix K. Rioja, Advisor 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Mark W. Rider 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
   
Dr. Susan E. Cozzens 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Sally Wallace 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
   
Dr. Gregory B. Lewis 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
  
   
  Date Approved:  October 14, 2013 
	  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my mother, Kim Seng-Ath, 1956-2002 
  
iv	  
	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my dissertation chair, Dr. Felix K. 
Rioja, for making this dissertation possible. I would not be writing this dissertation; 
hence this acknowledgement, had it not been for Dr Rioja’s guidance and support. His 
commitment to serving as my dissertation chair, his clear directions, advice, and 
encouragement have been the foremost sources supporting allowing me the opportunity 
to successfully finish the project. I also wish to thank my dissertation committee 
members, Dr. Susan E. Cozzens, Dr. Gregory B. Lewis, Dr. Mark W. Rider, and Dr. 
Sally Wallace, for their insightful suggestions and comments on the drafts preceding this 
final dissertation. 
I would also like to thank my father, sisters, and the rest of my family for their 
unconditional love and support. I especially want to thank my aunt, Kim Sokkhorn, for 
her relentless support and prayers which have always given me spiritual strengths to go 
through this challenging academic journey. 
I also owe deep gratitude to Jayoung unni (Dr. Jayoung Choi) who has never 
given up on me. She has been my great friend, mentor, and sister who had walked me 
through the most demanding part of my graduate studies. Particularly, I am most grateful 
for her outstanding support and direction over the years while I worked on this 
dissertation. Finally, I thank my best friends, Rachana, Chakrya, and Vortey, for the 
continuous support and encouragement they have given me while I pursued this degree. 
My studies would have been much harder without them. 
  
v	  
	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES viii 
SUMMARY ix 
 
CHAPTER 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
2 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN AID DISTRIBUTION 5 
2.1 Introduction  5 
2.2 Literature Review 9 
2.3 Data and Methodology 37 
2.4 Results 48 
2.5 Conclusion 57 
3 THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID AND INSTITUTIONS ON  
 HUMAN WELFARE 59 
3.1 Introduction  59 
3.2 Literature Review 63 
3.3 Data and Methodology 75 
3.4 Results 82 
3.5 Conclusion 92 
4 CONCLUSION 93 
APPENDIX A: COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS IN ESSAY 1 114 
APPENDIX B: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES FOR ESSAY 1 115 
vi	  
	  
APPENDIX C: REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF AID AND 
INSTITUTIONS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION                            
AND INEQUALITY (ADDITIONAL) 116 
APPENDIX D: REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF AID               
AND INSTITUTIONS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND 
INEQUALITY (BY INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENT) 119 
APPENDIX E: REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF AID               
AND INSTITUTIONS ON INCOME DISTRIBTUTION AND 
INEQUALITY (INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS) 120 
APPENDIX F: COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS IN ESSAY 2 121 
APPENDIX G: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS AND SOURCES FOR ESSAY 2 122 
APPENDIX H: REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE LAGGED EFFECT OF        
AID AND INSTITUTIONS ON HUMAN WELFARE 123 
APPENDIX I: REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF AID               
AND INSTITUTIONS ON HUMAN WELFARE                                                    
(BY INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENT) 124 
APPENDIX J: REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF AID                
AND INSTITUTIONS ON HUMAN WELFARE             
(INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS) 125 
REFERENCES 126 
  
vii	  
	  
LIST OF TABLES 
  Page 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Essay 1 (five-year averaged) 98 
Table 2.2: Correlations for Essay 1 (five-year averaged) 99 
Table 2.3: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Aid and Institutions                              
on Income Distribution and Inequality using OLS 100 
Table 2.4: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Aid and Institutions                               
on Income Distribution and Inequality  101 
Table 2.5: Robustness to Sample Restrictions 104 
Table 2.6: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Tied Aid and Institutions                        
on Income Distribution and Inequality 105 
Table 2.7: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Untied Aid and Institutions                   
on Income Distribution and Inequality 106 
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Essay 2 (five-year averaged) 107 
Table 3.2: Correlations for Essay 2 (five-year averaged) 108 
Table 3.3: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Aid and Institutions                              
on Human Welfare 109 
Table 3.4: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Aid and Institutions                              
on Human Welfare (by Sector) 111 
Table 3.5: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Bilateral Aid and Institutions               
on Human Welfare 112 
Table 3.6: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Multilateral Aid and Institutions           
on Human Welfare 112 
Table 3.7: Regression Estimates of the Impact of Aid and Institutions                              
on Human Welfare Considering PPE 113 
 
viii	  
	  
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 2.1: Sector Allocation from 1990 to 2011                                                 
(percentage of total disbursement) 97 
Figure 2.2: Social Sector Sub-Allocation from 1990 to 2011                                             
(in 2010 million dollars) 97 
  
ix	  
	  
SUMMARY 
 
Billions of dollars in development aid are sent to developing countries every year. 
Weak institutions in recipient countries are the main impediments often discussed to 
prevent aid from reaching the intended targets. At the same time, they also hinder aid 
effectiveness in improving the lives of the people. This dissertation argues that the impact 
of aid on income distribution and human welfare in recipient countries differs by their 
institutional quality. Institutions encompass many different dimensions. This dissertation 
focuses on: corruption in government, quality of bureaucracy, and the rule of law. This 
study explores the impact in two essays. 
The first essay investigates the role of institutions in aid distribution. In particular, 
we examine the interplay between aid and institutions on income shares of different 
population groups (measured by income quintiles), and on the gap between the rich and 
the poor (measured by the Gini coefficient). The study uses Principal Component 
Analysis to construct an institutional index from the three components: corruption, 
bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. Employing Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
methodology on a panel data of 85 countries from 1960 to 2004, this study finds that an 
increase in aid as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreases the income 
shares of the poor (quintile 1 and quintile 2), but increases that of the rich (quintile 5), 
thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor (Gini coefficient). Contrary to 
our main hypothesis, though, recipient countries’ institutions do not play any role in aid 
distribution.  
Similarly, the second essay also focuses on the importance of recipient 
institutions, but it assesses aid effectiveness in improving human welfare. The study 
considers five human development indicators: the Human Development Index (HDI), the 
health index, the infant mortality rate, the education index, and the average years of 
schooling. The study empirically tests the hypothesis by utilizing the same methodology 
as in the first essay, but on a panel of 80 countries from 1980 to 2004. The findings 
suggest that human welfare in recipient countries improves as aid increases. The 
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improvement appears to be driven more by the health than the education sector. 
Furthermore, aid is more effective in countries with poorer institutional quality, which is 
contrary to the hypothesis. However, the results are not consistent when taking into 
account government’s pro-poor public expenditure. 
1	  
	  
CHAPTER 1	  
INTRODUCTION	  
 
 
 
Official foreign aid to developing countries became an institution in 1947 when 
the Marshall Plan sought to reconstruct the European countries following the destruction 
caused by World War II. By the 1960s, aid had reached many developing countries and 
assistant programs had grown in significance (Brautigam & Knack, 2004). Over the past 
five decades, the amount of official aid provided has totaled to more than $2.3 trillion 
(Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). The level of development aid has experienced a steeper 
increase in the last decade by almost doubling in size from slightly less than $90 billion 
in 2001 to roughly $166 billion in 2010 (in 2010 dollars)1. The recent tight national 
budgets among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, however, has put much pressure on the provision of aid to developing countries. 
In 2011, aid from major donors fell by almost three percent, ending the continuous 
upward trend in aid volume from 1997 (not taking into account debt relief)2. Even with 
declines, the size and scope of development assistance have indicated the importance of 
foreign aid to the world’s poor. 
However, development scholars remain divided on whether aid works. Two major 
camps in the aid debates are Jeffrey Sachs’s and William Easterly’s. Sachs (2005) 
defends the positive contributions and advocates for more aid to the world’s poorest 
people, while Easterly (2006) argues that aid simply does not work. Sachs (2005) 
suggests that aid can bring about preconditions for the market to work. He argues that the 
market will bypass the world’s poor if basic infrastructure and human capital are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Author’s calculation based on OECD (2012b) database. 
2 Source: “Development: Aid to developing countries falls because of global recession” from 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalrecession.h
tm 
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feasible. In Sachs’s argument, the poor are too poor to solve their own problems, and 
their governments are too poor to efficiently provide for basic needs, such as healthcare, 
and education. When governments in developing countries fail to provide the necessities 
to meet the basic needs of the people, the outside world should intervene and provide 
them with assistance to help them get on their feet. Poor countries thus need help from 
rich nations to fill in the missing finances, which can then allow the market to take charge. 
In essence, Sachs sees aid not as a handout of welfare, but as an investment for 
sustainable growth. He also argues that aid brings about not only a welfare increase in 
recipient countries, but also that of the world (e.g., by stopping various diseases that can 
travel across continents). Moreover, aid also benefits the rich nations with respect to their 
national security. Although he persistently defends the positive contribution of 
development aid to the world’s poor and advocates for more of it, the aid proponent 
remains concerned about how to ensure that the money benefits the intended 
communities and is the real investment to end poverty rather than to support a few 
individuals, making aid an endless support. 
On the other hand, Easterly’s (2006) camp argues that aid is the developed 
world’s way of imposing its plan on the developing world. Particularly, aid simply goes 
through an already highly bureaucratic international donor system to another highly 
bureaucratic national system of the recipient countries with the aim to change policies. 
Such an attempt to change policies does not work, and it can do more harm than good 
when it comes to politics. This especially occurs when the aid continues, even though the 
leaders are corrupt. The plans do not work and billions of dollars are wasted because of 
poor implementation and little motivation for self help. He also points to recipient 
countries’ poor institutions as an impediment to the implementation of those plans, 
preventing aid from reaching the poor and filling up the pockets of the powerful. In one 
way or another, Easterly sees aid as only an extension of the power of dictators, and not 
in helping recipient countries. His suggestion is to allow the free-market to find its own 
way to the solutions of lifting the world’s poor, particularly through the agents for change, 
whom he refers to as Searchers, to bring about long-lasting homegrown development. 
Even though Easterly claims that development aid delivers close to no development, he 
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does not oppose the idea of lending hands to the poor through aid. The assistance though 
should be basic and start from the grassroots level. 
Overall, the core argument of whether to aid or not or even how to provide the aid 
to ensure positive outcomes involves the problem of weak institutions in countries who 
are receiving the assistance. Poor institutions encompass various dimensions, such as 
poor quality of bureaucracy, weak adherence of law, rampant corruption, and 
mismanagement of public resources. Weak institutions not only prevent development aid 
from reaching its intended target, but also lessen the magnitude of the impact on other 
social aspects aimed at improving human welfare in recipient countries. 
This dissertation joins the discussion on aid by also focusing on the role of 
recipient countries’ institutions. The study empirically explores the effect of institutions 
on the impact of aid on income distribution and human welfare in two essays. Essay 1 
studies the role of institutions in aid distribution. Specifically, it examines the effect of 
aid on income shares of different population groups, as measured by income quintiles, 
conditional on institutional quality in recipient countries. Furthermore, the research also 
joins the growing concerns of increasing inequality in developing countries by analyzing 
whether aid can bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Additionally, since tied aid (sectoral aid) and untied aid (non-sectoral aid) 
may carry different incentives that can affect the way aid is distributed, the study also 
investigates the impact of the two aid types on income distribution. The institutions 
considered in the analysis comprise of three components: corruption in government, 
bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. We employ the Principal Component Analysis 
to construct an index of institutions and use the instrumental variable method to take into 
account the potential causality between aid and income inequality. 
Essay 2 examines the impact of aid on improving recipient countries’ overall 
living standards. Essay 2 employs the same methodology and focuses on the role of 
institutions as in Essay 1, but assesses aid effectiveness on non-monetary welfare. The 
study also takes into account the recipient government’s pro-poor public expenditure, 
which is a potential channel of the mechanisms through which aid affects welfare. 
4	  
	  
The two essays are connected through two common objectives: (a) to study the 
impact of aid on different outcomes, and (b) to highlight the importance of institutions in 
the provision of aid.  
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CHAPTER 2	  
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN AID DISTRIBUTION	  
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The international community is committed to ending the world’s extreme poverty. 
Their commitment to focus on poverty is reflected through the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), one of which is to cut extreme poverty by half by 2015. To accomplish 
this goal, the donor community pledged to increase aid by focusing on areas having the 
largest impact on poverty. In particular, social and economic sectors, which are often 
perceived as crucial for poverty reduction, have continued to receive the largest share of 
aid. From 1990 to 2011, the combined share of these two sectors account for up to 50% 
of total aid disbursement. Particularly, the social sector has received the largest funding 
of approximately 34% of total aid, of which education, and government and civil society 
have received the largest share of equal amounts (see Figure 2.1). If we examine the trend 
of aid given to the social sector, government and civil society saw an increasing of 
support starting in 2000, this surpassed education and other sectors funding in 2002 (see 
Figure 2.2). The support to this sector comes in the wake of increasing recognition of the 
valuable contribution that civil society and community empowerment can make to 
policy-making process. On the other hand, the education and health sectors also continue 
to receive large shares among other important contributions, such as water and sanitation, 
population policy and reproductive health. 
 Donor countries disburse a substantial proportion of aid funding to the world’s 
poor through recipient governments, which distribute the funds to the general public. 
Even in cases when governments do not distribute the funds directly, recipient 
governments are among the major implementing partners of aid projects/programs, e.g. 
they work in collaboration with other NGOs or aid agencies. During the allocation, a 
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recipient country’s population in different income quintile groups may benefit from 
development aid differently even though the aid mostly targets poverty reduction. 
However, critics of foreign aid often argue that much of the transferred resources do not 
reach the intended recipients, and in some cases, only a small fraction of the money gets 
to the target. The main impediment that plagues many of the aid efforts is weak 
institutions in recipient countries. Corruption of the recipient institution is the most 
prevalent issue. Corruption can hamper not only economic development, as many studies 
suggest, but it can also change the distribution of public resources by diverting the 
resources towards specific groups. Specifically, corruption redirects aid money away 
from its intended target to a small segment of the population, increasing income 
inequality. 
Poor quality of bureaucracy is another widespread issue in developing countries. 
The poor who depend heavily on government-provided goods and services usually have 
limited access to the services, and they often describe their experiences with government 
bureaucrats as unpleasant (Narayan, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte, 2000). 
Generally, only those with connections and those who are able to pay bribes are the first 
in line to receive services. Lack of competency and motivation, shirking, and absenteeism 
among government officials also undermine the quality of public goods and services 
provisions. When a large amount of development aid is transferred through government 
bureaucratic system, which is often described as corrupt and inefficient, the poor may not 
benefit much from the transferred resources. Furthermore, the rule of law, which includes 
judges, court personnel, and police, is supposedly in place to enforce public 
accountability in the bureaucracy and ensure public sector integrity. When the rule of law 
cannot perform its functions, as is often the case in many developing countries, 
corruption is rampant and government accountability is plummeting, affecting any 
resource distribution coming through the system. 
Motivated by the observed relevance of institutions in allocating public resources 
and the implementation of aid projects/programs, this research takes into consideration 
the role that institutions play in aid distribution. Specifically, the study examines the 
impact of aid on different income quintiles as well as on income inequality and asks 
7	  
	  
whether the impact differs by recipient countries’ institutional quality. We argue that aid 
distributed to countries with poor institutional quality has less impact on promoting better 
conditions of the poor, but it can bring about much change if given to countries with good 
institutions. The three institutional dimensions considered in the study are corruption, 
quality of bureaucracy, and the rule of law, which commonly work together to shape how 
the resources are shared and used. 
On another note, some aid is tied to specific social expenditures to make it more 
traceable while others are untied, such as general budget support or action relating to debt. 
Recently, donor countries have increasingly provided more tied aid with respect to 
specific investment in infrastructure such as transportation, water services, or energy 
(Chatterjee & Turnovsky, 2007). Aid tied to different sectors is a better targeted aid than 
the untied aid. Thus, by inducing different incentives, tied and untied aid may also have 
different effects on income distribution, thereby income inequality. For that reason, we 
also include tied and untied aid in our analysis. 
 
Research Questions 
This study tries to answer the following questions: 
1. Which income quintiles in recipient countries benefit the most from foreign aid? 
2. Does the quality of institutions affect aid distribution in recipient countries? 
3. Does aid reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor? 
4. Does aid reduce income inequality more in countries with better institutional 
quality? 
These are worthwhile questions to explore because it is critical to examine who in 
recipient countries gains the most benefits from the huge transfers of aid funding often 
perceived to help the poor in the receiving countries. Likewise, we want to have a better 
understanding whether aid brings about social justice by closing the gap between the rich 
and the poor. More importantly, since recipient countries’ institutions are widely 
perceived as key to success for aid efforts, we want to explore if this is truly the case. 
8	  
	  
Possible Contributions 
The potential contributions of this essay are as follows: 
First, despite exhaustive aid research, most previous studies have focused on the 
effect of aid on growth. By examining the effect of aid on income shares of different 
income groups, as well as on the gap between the rich and the poor, this study diverges 
from the path of traditional aid literature into exploring another growing branch of the 
literature. That is to say, this study contributes to filling the gap in aid literature by 
investigating the effect of aid from a different standpoint: the impact of aid on income 
distribution and inequality.  
Second, if aid scholars are interested in the impact of aid on income distribution, 
the majority focuses on aid impact on Gini coefficient, and they do not address the issue 
with respect to which income groups are the largest beneficiary. While using Gini 
coefficient may answer the question of whether aid has any role in reducing or expanding 
income inequality, using the shape of income distribution allows this study to elucidate 
how aid is distributed among different populations. This study addresses both aspects of 
inequality as measured by Gini coefficient and the shape of income distribution. 
Third, in addition to its contribution to a few studies on the role of institutions in 
aid effectiveness3, the study contributes to the empirical aid literature by focusing on the 
area that has not been addressed much: the role of institutions in aid resource distribution. 
By building on previous literature which explores only small and defined types of 
institutions—democracy and corruption—this study places emphasis on the institutional 
setting that covers wider institutional components (corruption, bureaucratic quality, and 
the rule of law) to determine how they affect aid distribution in recipient countries. 
Fourth, some studies of aid distribution have attempted to uncover the effect of 
aid by type. However, two specific types of aid that are overlooked in the literature are 
tied and untied aid. These two aid types may induce specific sets of incentives, leading to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Even though a number of studies find that institutions contribute to economic growth, it is surprising that 
only a few studies examine institutions as the conditioning mediator of aid effectiveness on growth. The 
studies include: Collier and Dollar (2002), Burnside and Dollar (2004), and Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas 
(2009).  
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different outcomes in bridging the gap between the rich and the poor. By incorporating 
the impact of aid by type, the study continues to add more to the existing literature about 
aid distributions. 
 
Structure of the Essay 
The rest of this essay is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of 
the definitions of institutions used by previous literature, the mechanism through which 
institutions affect aid distribution, and other aid and institution related literature. Section 
2.3, Data and Methodology, provides a simple general model of the interplay between aid 
and institutions, the method, and the data used for the analysis. Section 2.4 provides 
empirical results and discussions, while the last section, Section 2.5, provides the results 
of the analysis. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
This section of the study summarizes the theories and evidence underpinning the 
impact of aid on income inequality and the role played by institutions in 
reducing/increasing the income gap. The study relates to literature in two major areas: the 
distributional effect of aid, which also includes the impact of tied and untied aid, and the 
influence of institutions on income inequality. To fully comprehend the role of 
institutions in aid distribution, we start by understanding what institutions are, i.e. 
defining institutions, which is followed by the arguments as to why institutions are 
important in aid distribution. We then provide the conceptual relationship underlying the 
distributional path by reviewing related literature. 
 
2.2.1 Defining Institutions 
Prior literature presents a variety of definitions of institutions and does not reach a 
consensus on the definition. Acemoglu (2009), for instance, asserts that it is somewhat 
10	  
	  
difficult to define institutions and sometimes literature is not clear about its definition. 
Furthermore, the literature often uses institutions and governance interchangeably. 
Of the many definitions, the one offered by Dollar and Levine (2006) state that 
institutions are “the rules, norms, and behaviors” that determine the economic 
environment (p. 2036). The definition encompasses both formal and informal institutions. 
Formal institutions include constitutions, political regime, the rule of law, and other rules 
and regulations enforced by different societies using its coercive power and organization. 
Informal institutions, on the other hand, reflect cultural values, social conduct, traditions, 
norms, and other social mechanisms that are enforced through interpersonal ties and 
relations (Fabro & Aixalá, 2009; Zhuang, Dios, & Lagman-Martin, 2010). For the 
purpose of this dissertation, we are going to use the definition of institutions by Dollar 
and Levine (2006), due mainly to its simplicity. The best measures to fit this definition of 
institutions are: corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. Quality of 
bureaucracy and the rule of law are formal institutions because they are regulations 
enforced by a society. On the other hand, corruption is a form of informal institutions 
because it is enforced through interpersonal tie and relationship.   
The literature on the causes and consequences of corruption is also full of vague 
and diverse definitions of corruption. Corruption can occur in various forms, and 
different countries and cultures may consider different activities as corrupt. For instance, 
what is considered as a courtesy of gift giving in some cultures and countries could be 
considered as corrupt practices in others (Ear, 2006). Thus, it is difficult to find a 
common explanation of what constitutes corruption. Several studies use the definition of 
corruption as the abuse of public power for private gain (Maxwell et al., 2008; Rothstein, 
2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Treisman, 2000). On the basis of this definition, various 
activities can be considered as corrupt, which includes, but is not limited to, the selling of 
public assets for personal gain, dishonest bidding on government contracts, nepotism, and 
the issuance of permits or licenses in return for bribes (Olken, 2007; Rock & Bonnett, 
2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Many studies provide other alternative definitions of 
corruption; however, for simplicity, as well as consistency, we will use the definition of 
the abuse of public power for private gain.    
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Similarly, bureaucratic quality covers different dimensions of government 
effectiveness ranging from the ease of doing business to the recruitment and training of 
public officials. Even though a large amount of the literature employs the concept of 
bureaucracy, it nevertheless remains uncertain as to what bureaucracy means. Various 
definitions are available. Beetham (1996) synthesizes a list of explanations that includes 
“rule by officials, a system of professional administration, organizational inefficiency, 
public administration, non-market institutions, undemocratic organization” (p. 1). As 
bureaucracy does not have a definitive definition, we prefer to use a more general 
meaning of bureaucracy as the layers of state organizations engaging in policy 
formulation and implementation, and in regulating, and delivering services (Hyden, Court, 
& Mease, 2003). With respect to the workforce in the system, the term “bureaucrat” is 
sometime perceived as a derogatory term and often replaced by “official” (Downs, 1964). 
In our study, we use bureaucrat and official interchangeably. 
Lastly, the very concept of the rule of law also remains ambiguous. The rule of 
law covers various dimensions from security of person (civil conflict and crime, control 
of violence, state failure etc.), to property and contracting rights (in economic 
perspective), to government checks and balances (Haggard & Tiede, 2011). The most 
suitable description of the rule of law in our study is the government checks and balances, 
which we use throughout the study. 
 
2.2.2 Institutions and Aid Distribution: The Mechanism 
Before addressing the argument of why one would expect recipient’s institutions 
to play a role in aid distribution, this section starts by briefly reviewing some aid efforts 
in receiving countries. The discussion draws mainly on the work of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) which are among the largest project/program implementers. 
NGOs often work closely with the poor at the grassroots level and understand the 
struggles of the poor the most. Aid funding to NGOs supports different activities in the 
community, especially in rural areas where the poor can most often be found. Their 
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services include but are not limited to children and adult education, health, agriculture, 
employment, skills training, and other advocacy services. 
Much aid funding has been allocated to the education sector, a goal of the MDGs. 
In many developing countries, where many people barely have adequate necessities to 
support their lives, school attendance is low as poor families find it hard to send their 
children to school. Unlike richer families with fewer children, poor parents not only bear 
significant cost from school fees, uniforms, and textbooks when sending their children to 
school, but they may also incur a loss of income that the families would otherwise earn. 
Aid efforts through NGOs thus are there to provide all school necessities and even cash 
grant to families who send their children to school as an incentive to encourage more 
attendance (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011; Kremer, 2003). The outcomes of NGOs’ work on 
improving education sector in many parts of the world are by and large more than 
satisfactory. An NGO in India focusing on education, for example, can reach out to 
200,000 children in fourteen states in India. The evaluation of the program has also 
shown that their work improved education outcomes (Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, & Linden, 
2007). 
A health sector is another major concern for developing countries. Maternal 
mortality rates are high. Nearly 1,000 expectant mothers die every day; 98 percent of 
those are in developing countries (CARE, 2011). Many NGOs’ missions are to educate 
women about pregnancy and the dangers associated with it and to make maternal health 
services more accessible. For instance, CARE is among the many NGOs working on this 
issue in Bangladesh, where 52% of the rich use maternal health services as opposed to 
only 17% of the poor. They also work in the most difficult environments, such as in some 
parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where maternal mortality is twice as high 
as its national rate and child mortality is among the highest (CARE, 2011). In regards to 
child mortality, children are dying every year from diseases that are simple to prevent, 
such as malaria, diarrhea, and tuberculosis, not to mention the millions of children who 
go hungry and die of malnutrition around the world. The diseases are especially common 
in areas with poor sanitation and without clean drinking water. Aid projects are also 
focusing on improving the living conditions of the poor. In Zambia, Population Services 
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International (PSI) is providing chlorine bleach to purify water at subsidized rate, while 
other organizations work on providing bed nets and vaccinations, among other preventive 
measures (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). These organizations believe that better health can 
lead to improved educational outcomes and a better future income. 
Many international organizations are also working on micro-finance to provide 
small loans to the poor when most commercial banks would not consider them worthy 
loan applicants. Widely known as a poverty reduction tool, micro-finance allows the poor 
access to financial capital. The capital enables the poor to add to their income by 
employing new means of income (e.g. street food vending or trading small commodity), 
securing their personal safety nets and sustainable livelihoods. Microcredit and micro-
finance are largely motivated by the wave of success pioneered in Bangladesh during the 
1970s. In Bangladesh, where nearly one third of the population is living below the 
poverty line4, NGOs normally provide three major services, among which microfinance 
stands on the top of the list followed by health and sanitation. A typical NGO in 
Bangladesh services about 4,300 beneficiary households (Gauri & Galef, 2005). Micro-
finance is also popular in other part of the world and is reaching out to an estimate of 150 
to 200 million borrowers (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). 
 Furthermore, agriculture and livestock are at the core of food security. The 
majority of the poor depend largely on agriculture to sustain a functional livelihood. 
Unfortunately, they constantly face risk from natural disasters such as drought and flood 
annually. Crops from subsistence farming can barely feed poor farmers throughout the 
year, let alone leave them with minimal income for saving or for improving their 
agricultural techniques. Some farmers cannot even set aside a small amount of money to 
buy fertilizer for the next planting season. Thus, many NGOs are working to tackle the 
issue by initiating microsavings as well as providing fertilizer vouchers for farmers to 
buy soon after their harvesting season (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Other NGOs, such as 
Oxfam and World Vision, are also focusing on small-scale farming by improving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Source: The World Bank: Bangladesh Overview from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bangladesh/overview 
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agricultural practices and access to markets and providing tools, seeds, fertilizers, as well 
as building pipes and canals to ensure sufficient water for the fields (Oxfam, 2012; World 
Vision, 2013).  
Nonetheless, poor institutions at the implementation stage disrupt/undermine 
much aid efforts to reduce poverty. Various anecdotes suggest how corruption drains 
away a bulk of aid money from aid projects/programs, hampering the very efforts of 
development assistance to the world’s poor. For instance, ranked among the bottom by 
Transparency International for its corruption index (at the top are those with low 
corruption), Cambodia saw a major corruption scandal in World Bank financed projects 
in 2004. The World Bank sought $2.8 million dollars in repayment, and terminated $2.5 
million in project funding after the finding. The government of Cambodia later agreed to 
repay the missing funds to the World Bank and had committed to reform its various 
functions (Ear, 2006; World Bank, 2007). The missing funds may not appear to be much 
compared to other high-profile aid captures, but in absolute terms, the money could bring 
about improvement to the standard of living where more than one third of the population 
then lived below the national poverty line. 
 
Through what trajectory do corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law affect the 
distribution of aid to the poor? 
Before proceeding further into this analysis, it is worth emphasizing that a large 
proportion of development assistance flows into recipient countries through government 
systems. These systems design, implement, and deliver the goods and services coming in 
and channel them to the different groups. Even in cases where aid flows through different 
channels, recipient governments are mostly counterparts to a larger distribution chain in 
those aid projects/programs. Because recipient governments are the main aid distributor 
or at least take part in the distribution, any flaws or obstructions stemming from 
recipients’ institutions (i.e. corruption, quality of bureaucracy, the rule of law) affect the 
distribution of aid. Indeed, the three dimensions of institutions function together in this 
aspect. Corruption can affect aid distribution through two channels, direct and indirect 
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channels. Bureaucracy affects the distribution directly and/or via corruption. The rule of 
law, on the other hand, can either provide the opportunity for the corrupt activities to 
continue or it can prevent corruption from spreading.  
Corruption changes the course of the transfers directly when the recipient 
countries’ bureaucracy are layered with corrupt officials. They siphon off aid money 
before it reaches the intended poor; therefore, the direct channel of the impact of 
corruption constitutes how bureaucracy affects aid distribution via corruption. The 
indirect channel, on the other hand, is through the impact of corruption on bureaucratic 
quality and on other factors supporting the implementation of aid programs. Aside from 
working through corruption, bureaucracy affects the distribution when the capacity and 
motivation of bureaucrats implementing the projects are limited. The rest of this section 
discusses how institutions play a role in aid distribution using examples from studies or 
case studies at different project levels. The focus of the discussion is on several social 
sectors, including education, health, and infrastructure, which are perceived to be the 
most crucial for poverty reduction. 
Corruption affects aid distribution directly by diverting the funding away from its 
intended targets, including direct theft, bribing in bidding procedure, reporting of 
nonexistent labor expense, and procurement scams in various forms such as submissions 
of the same invoices multiple times, purchases of unnecessary items, or receipts forgery 
by vendors (Easterly, 2006; Maxwell et al., 2008; Olken, 2007). Though the 
consequences of these scams are low, their high occurrences can have a detrimental 
impact to the very efforts of poverty reduction as they accumulate. The direct impact of 
corruption occurs in various public sectors, including health sector; the damage from 
which can be profound. For instance, Easterly (2006) reports that aid funding to health 
sectors through government often go missing in “patronage-swollen national health 
bureaucracies” and “health officials often sell aid-financed drugs on the black market” (p. 
259). The author further asserts that in some countries such as Cameroon, Guinea, 
Tanzania, and Uganda, roughly 30 percent to 70 percent of medicines are lost before 
reaching the patients. 
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In addition to the health sector, the infrastructure sector is another attractive target 
for corruption. Basic infrastructure, such as roads and bridges connecting rural poor, are 
for local farmers and manufacturers to transport their products to the markets. Corruption 
takes away the money from the poor when community leaders or project implementers 
(contractors) trim materials from making those roads or bridges and add to their pockets. 
When the number of bridges and the length of roads are built as intended by the programs, 
using less materials than the recommended standards means that the infrastructures are of 
poor quality, which can become very vulnerable to damages (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). In 
a study assessing the effectiveness of auditing in reducing corruption, Olken (2007) finds 
roughly 20 percent of materials for road construction are missing in a World Bank loan 
program funding through the Indonesian government. This type of corruption can also 
damage roads and bridges when law enforcement officers receive bribes from overload 
trucks and allow them to constantly operate on the poorly built roads (Banerjee & Duflo, 
2011). The poor then are in the same situation as though no roads or bridges were built 
because the updated ones are weak and nearly useless. 
Furthermore, as generally is the case, public fund misuse can occur at all levels of 
governments from the central to local district level, all of which can be consequential for 
the aid distribution. Another example of the direct effect of corruption is in the education 
sector in Uganda at the local level. Reinikka and Svensson (2003) track public funds 
allocated for education from the central Ugandan government to its local facilities. 
Initially, only twenty percent of the entitlements reached the local schools. Then, after the 
Ugandan government published the monthly transferred grant in local newspapers, the 
percentage of the funds reaching the local facilities grew to more than eighty percent. 
Reinikka and Svensson (2003) share many anecdotes suggesting that the missing money 
was used to increase counselors’ and bureaucrats’ allowances, and in some cases when 
the money did reach local offices, the elites at the local government decided where the 
money went—most likely to their own pockets. Notwithstanding the fact that the above 
unfortunate case is on a central government grant, we should note that part of the grant 
may have been aid resources because part of aid is actually used to finance recipient 
government expenditure. 
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The indirect channel through which corruption affects the distribution of aid is 
through its impact on bureaucracy and on other factors that work to support the poor. 
Corruption can be both a cause and a consequence of poor bureaucratic quality. When the 
mechanism for recruitment and selection of civil servants is not in place, people bribe to 
be placed in public offices with the prospect of abusing the power for higher returns. 
Corrupt officials then change the course of aid distribution via corruption as discussed 
above. Corruption also affects other factors that complement the distribution of aid 
towards the poor. In particular, it introduces policy distortions leading to misallocation of 
public resources (e.g., directing aid funds toward projects offering higher opportunities 
for corrupting), as well as changing composition of government expenditure. Studying 
the effect of corruption on the composition of government spending, Mauro (1998) finds 
a robust amount of evidence that corruption causes a decline in government expenditure 
on education, and he also finds some evidence of the similar effect on health spending. 
Since part of the expenditures is aid money, corruption changes the course of the 
distribution by shifting away aid funds from the sectors that the poor can potentially 
benefit the most.  
Additionally, when corruption is a norm in many developing countries, 
specifically in the health and education sectors, the poor still cannot benefit from aid 
funded infrastructure aimed at providing them with accessibility to basic healthcare and 
education (e.g., health centers, specialty clinics, or school buildings). Generally, the poor 
still cannot afford education or health services when they have to pay bribes or additional 
illicit fees to get these services (Menon & Morgan, 2013). Some common corruption 
practices in health or education sectors include healthcare providers receiving private 
payments to see some patients first, or providing medicine only to those who pay extra 
money, or school teachers collecting bribes from students. When the standard of living 
for many is at the edge of subsistence, and some are even living in extreme poverty, the 
fear of losing additional income from sending their children to school is already a burden 
for poor families, let alone having to pay bribes or additional fees to get education 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). 
Aside from its indirect effect, bureaucratic quality affects aid distribution directly 
when capacity and motivation of counterparts or implementers are limited. In many 
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developing countries, entry into civil servant positions is usually not through open 
examination, but strong connection, nepotism, or bribery. Equally important training and 
monitoring of civil servants are only marginally available in most countries. As a result, 
bureaucrats who supposedly are experts in their fields lack both expertise and knowhow. 
Additionally, low motivation and shirking among government employees, arguably 
resulting from low salary, are also widespread issues. Since recipient governments are 
generally the aid projects/programs implementers, or the counterparts who work in 
collaboration with other NGOs or aid agencies, the potential outcomes of those efforts are 
also constrained by such limitations. Indeed, as World Bank (1998) notes, donors and 
government technocrats used to assume that the benefits of aid projects/programs would 
start flowing once the infrastructure (e.g., health clinics, roads) are completed, but 
actually they would start flowing only when “there are adequate incentives for (mainly 
civil service) providers” (p. 88). Easterly (2006) further exemplifies how poor 
bureaucratic quality can be an issue hampering the delivery of health aid. In the treatment 
of AIDS that requires fairly complicated care and handling of drugs, health professionals 
at the local level are often poorly trained and cannot meet the high requirements of the 
treatment. As a consequence, the end result of the intervention can be rapid resistance to 
the drugs, in addition to ineffective treatments. 
The poor mostly rely on services provided by their governments, which are often 
funded by foreign aid; hence, access to and consumption of those services are critical to 
the question of whether the poor benefit from the assistance. As widely known, the poor 
usually have low access to public services and only the rich and the well-connected are 
able to pay bribes to get privilege access to those government provided goods and 
services (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Hyden et al., 2003). Adding to that, it 
is reported that the poor’s experiences with bureaucrats is dreadful. In fact, Narayan et al. 
(2000) highlight that the poor often describe their experiences with bureaucrats as 
unpleasant and unfair and that the bureaucrats are corrupt. When a large amount of 
development assistance is channeled through such inefficient and frequently corrupt 
bureaucratic system, the poor are not gaining the benefits from the assistance, but the 
already better-off are. Thus, the quality of bureaucracy in recipient countries indeed is 
important in the distribution. 
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Finally, the rule of law affects the distribution of aid funding through two lenses: 
(1) through control of private capture and corruption, and (2) through institutional checks 
on government. The rule of law is a tool in combating corruption when it prevents a 
corrupt behavior by prosecuting corrupt offenses. Many aid receiving countries are 
characterized by weak rule of law (e.g., dependent judicial system, not everyone is under 
the same law) signifying low probability of formal prosecution and punishment of corrupt 
officials when caught. As a result, corruption is rampant in such environments, the 
consequences of which are damaging to the course of aid distribution as discussed above. 
Furthermore, as Haggard and Tiede (2011) argue, the government has both the power and 
incentive to back out of its commitments, because the government does not follow 
through with its commitments, proper checks are needed. Nonetheless, lack of 
institutional checks on the government is not uncommon in many developing countries. 
With no suitable checks and balances, recipient government who manages the aid 
resources have all the incentives, for whatever reasons, to somehow manipulate and 
relocate the funds away from its intended use. This concept is known as fungibility (we 
discuss later). 
The discussion above undoubtedly shows that in a country where institutions are 
of poor quality (i.e., rampant corruption, poor quality of bureaucracy, weak rule of law), 
aid efforts are either poorly managed and implemented or aid funding is leaked along the 
distribution chain. In both cases, foreign aid is diverted away from reaching the intended 
targets. 
 
2.2.3 The Redistribution of Foreign Aid: A Conceptual Perspective 
The redistribution of development assistance from donor to recipient countries is 
generally explained by the contract theory within the principal-agent framework. 
Normally, a donor country presents as the principal, and the recipient government takes 
the role of an agent5. When aid is disbursed to recipient countries, several groups (e.g., 
politicians, bureaucrats, special interest groups) can divert aid resources into either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Some studies assume taxpayers in donor countries as the principals (see, for example,(Azam & Laffont, 
2003).  
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development or into rent which is captured by the elites6 (Paul, 2006). If the elites use aid 
for development purposes, the poor can benefit from the assistance as intended, but if 
they convert aid into rent, only their groups are benefiting. The result of which is higher 
income inequality in aid receiving countries. However, the latter is more likely to occur, 
especially as donors and recipient governments rarely have common objectives and 
interests, particularly with respect to the goal of poverty alleviation (Azam & Laffont, 
2003; Killick, 1997; Svensson, 2006). 
While donors may want to assist recipient countries in poverty reduction, 
recipient governments may also have other agendas in addition to poverty alleviation, e.g., 
answering to their constituency, which in most cases are not the poor (Svensson, 2006). 
When the interests of donors and recipient governments do not align and the governments 
usually have more information than donors, there is a chance that the governments take 
advantage of the information asymmetry to shirk or divert the transfers away from donors’ 
preferences into theirs. Consequently, the so called “agent problem” (especially, moral 
hazard problem) redirects aid away from its intended recipients, leading to unintended 
outcomes (e.g., higher income inequality) in development projects/programs. Moral 
hazard occurs when information asymmetry prevents donors from fully observing or 
verifying the action of recipient governments; for example, when the governments are 
corrupt, thus have the incentive to embezzle aid, or when bureaucrats shirk from work 
(Ouattara, Amegashie, & Strobl, 2009; Paul, 2006; Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). 
Therefore, any aid efforts delivering to countries with better institutional quality, where 
moral hazard is low, can better reach the intended targets. 
Donors may not be able to respond to recipient countries’ shirking behavior, but 
they may responds to rent-seeking and corrupt aspects of moral hazard by tying their  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to Angeles and Neanidis (2009), elites are the small proportion of the population who 
dominate a disproportional share of power, be it politically or economically. 
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assistance to specific projects (Ouattara et al., 2009; Ouattara, Amegashie, & Strobl, 
2013)7. They can either tie aid to an investment project, a policy reforming requirement, 
or to commodities and services among others (Chatterjee & Turnovsky, 2007; Kanbur, 
Sandler, & Morrison, 1999). With tied aid, donors have higher chances of tracking the 
assistance to a particular recipient group (Kanbur et al., 1999), while recipient 
governments are bound to oblige to the implementation of the conditions to be rewarded 
with more aid. For that reason, aid tied to different sectors can perform better than untied 
aid with respect to its positive impact on the poor. Indeed, a model by Azam and Laffont 
(2003) predicts that untied aid does not have any impact on the poor due mainly to moral 
hazard of the government in its redistribution practices. 
Even so, several aid fungibility studies8 indicate that tied aid can be very fungible. 
Fungibility occurs when recipient government reduces its own resources from sectors that 
receive aid funding and redirects the resources to other purposes not funded by the 
assistance. Eventually, donors are funding some other sectors/expenditures they did not 
intend for (Brown, 2012; Feyzioglu, Swaroop, & Zhu, 1998). With fungibility, tied aid is 
still not an ideal method to target aid. In contradiction to the fungibility literature, 
however, a related theory within public finance literature suggests otherwise. Specifically, 
the flypaper effect theory suggests that money would stick in the sector where it initially 
hits; therefore, there should be higher public spending in the sector receiving aid funding 
(McGillivray & Morrissey, 2001; Pettersson, 2007b; van de Walle & Mu, 2007). For 
instance, Pettersson (2007b) and van de Walle and Mu (2007) find the existence of a 
flypaper effect in foreign aid to Indonesia and Vietnam, respectively. As far as untied aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Tied aid can take several forms; a common form is the tying of aid to purchases of goods and services 
from donor countries’ suppliers or contractors or from a limited number of countries (Lahiri & Raimondos-
Moller, 1995). Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) point out that recent studies by the World Bank have 
noticed an increasingly higher proportion of aid is untied with respect to its requirement for procurement 
from donor countries, while more aid are tied to specific investment in infrastructure (such as transportation, 
water services, or energy). The move toward untying aid from procurement requirement may come after 
consensus findings of studies on the impact of such tied aid on recipient countries’ welfare. Mainly, the 
literature concludes that aid tied to procurement from specific countries or to other conditions in pursue of 
donors’ commercial interest reduces the value of development assistance and lowers welfare of recipient 
countries (see, for example,(Kemp & Kojima, 1985; Michael & van Marrewijk, 1998; Quartey, 2005). In 
this study, however, tied aid refers to aid tied to specific sectors. We use “tied aid”, “sectoral aid”, and 
“restricted aid” interchangeably. Similarly, “untied aid”, “non-sectoral aid”, and “unrestricted aid” are used 
interchangeably.	  
8  Fungibility literature studies the extent to which recipients use aid for the expenditure intended by donors 
(Feeny & Rogers, 2008). 
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is concerned, there is no restriction as to which sectors recipient governments can use the 
money for, thus making untied aid fully fungible (Brown, 2012). Taking these different 
characteristics into consideration, tied aid is better targeted aid than untied aid. We 
discuss the impact of tied and untied aid on income distribution in more detail in Section 
2.2.4 below. 
Apart from the principal-agent problem discussed above, the Samaritan’s 
dilemma is another aspect as it relates closely to the distribution of aid. The Samaritan’s 
dilemma occurs when donors are poverty averse and are “unable to commit not to help 
the poor” (Torsvik, 2005, p. 505). Recipient governments can then anticipate this kind 
behavior and take advantage of such softness. In particular, recipient governments have 
the incentive to present the country as poor to get more assistance, e.g., by not adopting 
policies that help lift the poor out of poverty. This will take place if they know that 
donors allocate their assistance based on the country’s poverty level (Paul, 2006; 
Pedersen, 2001; Svensson, 2000b; Torsvik, 2005). Thus, donors’ altruism may ultimately 
have an adverse effect on the poor. 
Despite donors’ altruism and concerns for recipient countries, the aid selectivity 
literature suggests that donors are not always purely altruistic. In particular, recipient’s 
need is one factor among many other political and strategic interests that donors consider 
when allocating aid. Recipient countries’ measures of need include indicators such as 
GDP per capita, the Human Development Index, poverty headcount, and primary school 
enrollment among others. Donors’ political and strategic interests include factors such as 
recipient’s geographical location, voting in the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA), and whether recipient countries are donors’ trade partners, former colonies, or 
members of their national security alliance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 
2002; Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2011; Harrigan & Wang, 2011). If donors are 
motivated by political and strategic interests rather than recipient’s need, aid is only 
partially designed for the poor in the first place. Thus, the distribution of aid can be 
biased towards the elites who support donors’ political interests. 
 The next section provides a discussion of the findings from previous literature 
concerning the impact of aid and institutions on income inequality. 
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2.2.4 Existing Literature on the Study of Aid and Institutions on                     
Income Inequality 
2.2.4.1 The Impact of Aid on Income Inequality 
So far, research on the impact of aid on income inequality is still limited, and 
different types of evidence—anecdotal, theoretical, and empirical—do not appear to 
support the claim that the poor are the primary beneficiaries of aid. The anecdotal 
evidence reports that those who benefit the most from foreign aid to developing countries 
are the elites and officials whose social class is in the upper income group. Numerous 
anecdotes are available from various high-profile cases, but the famous incidents often 
mentioned in aid literature include billions of dollars of public resource embezzlement in 
former Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko, in Indonesia under Suharto, and in the Philippines 
under Marcos (Bjornskov, 2010; Herzer & Nunnenkamp, 2012; Shafiullah, 2011; 
Svensson, 2005). 
Theoretical considerations have also laid some ground-work on the role of the aid 
receiving country, particularly in relation with moral hazard, in determining how foreign 
aid is distributed (Boone (1996), Svensson (2000a), Hodler (2007), and Economides, 
Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos (2008)). From the theoretical standpoint, an increase in a 
resource pool as a result of aid inflow induces corruption and other types of rent-seeking 
activities rather than productive activities (Economides et al., 2008; Hodler, 2007; 
Svensson, 2000a). The beneficiaries of those aid-induced rent-seeking activities, as 
termed by Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012), are those who engage in the activities, 
specifically those with immediate access to the resources who often belong to high 
income group. 
Empirical work on the issue is scarcely addressed in the literature. One of the first 
to study the impact of foreign aid on inequality, Chase-Dunn (1975) finds that aid is 
associated with increasing inequality. A later study by Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and 
Rubinson (1978) shares the same finding. These earlier studies are based primarily on 
dependency theory, which according to Bjornskov (2010) is no longer active on research 
agenda. Few studies also examine the impact between aid and inequality, the results from 
which are mixed but leaning more toward the inequality increasing effect of aid. Of the 
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few studies, only Shafiullah (2011) finds that aid reduces (minimally) income inequality. 
Other work finds either aid is associated with higher inequality or no evidence of the 
impact (see, for example,(Chong, Gradstein, & Calderon, 2009; Herzer & Nunnenkamp, 
2012; Layton & Nielson, 2009).  
The literature mainly stresses how those with the upper hand in aid resources 
misuse and mismanage the resources through rent-seeking or corruption. Government 
officials in particular play an important role in resource distribution as they are entitled 
with special privilege and authority in designing and implementing policies, and 
delivering goods and services (Gupta, Davoodi, et al., 2002; Hyden et al., 2003). They 
can either convert the resources into development as intended or use them for personal 
gain. The latter use is more prevailing since the redistribution of resources is the 
preferences of the group with more power whose goal is to maximize personal rent 
(Cervellati, Fortunato, & Sunde, 2008; Congdon Fors & Olsson, 2007). Private capture of 
aid resources then can be either through “direct appropriation (e.g., seizure of power) or 
manipulations of bureaucrats and politicians to implement favorable transfers, regulations 
or other redistributive policies” (Svensson, 2000a, p. 438). Lack of punishments of 
corrupt officials and insufficient rules and regulations to oversee political decision-
makings allow politicians and bureaucrats to continue draining aid into their pockets. 
Similarly, local elites are also at the central stage of the allocation since their 
firms are in charge of converting aid money into products and services, such as into 
health centers, school buildings, roads, and power supplies (Angeles & Neanidis, 2009). 
The elite and the well-connected can use their wealth to bribe government officials in aid 
related procurement contracts or in designing biasing policies, diminishing the impact of 
aid-funded programs on the genuine poor. In a corrupt system, corrupt officials would 
award a winning bid to the contractor who gives the highest bribe, not the highest quality 
goods or services. Local elites and officials work closely together in this respect to 
manage how aid is distributed. Indeed, the presence of political and wealth elites can be 
very harmful to the effort of development assistance. For instance, studying the role of 
elites in aid effectiveness, Angeles and Neanidis (2009) find that aid contributes less to 
growth in countries with higher percentage of powerful elite groups, measured in their 
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study by the percentage of European settlers to local population in colonial times. The 
finding suggests that the elites, together with government officials, redirect aid from its 
intended targets and use it only for the benefits of their groups, the consequence of which 
is higher income inequality. 
Specific studies on the impact of aid on income inequality also find similar results. 
Using survey data on assets, education, and health of each population quintile from 45 
developing countries, McGillivray, Fielding, Torres, and Knowles (2011) find that aid 
brings about improvement in well-being, but the bottom two income quintiles benefit 
much less from foreign aid than do the richer quintiles. Likewise, employing a panel 
cointegration technique to study the impact of aid on income inequality in 21 countries 
from 1970 through 1995, Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) find that aid increases income 
inequality. The results are robust under different estimation methods, datasets, and 
outliers. Interestingly, Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) argue that because their 
estimation technique captures overall effects of aid and inequality, hence free of any 
transmission channels (e.g., rent-seeking or private capture of the elites), aid by itself 
carries inequality increasing effect. In other words, they contend that aid increases 
inequality not due to elites’ moral hazard behavior, but because donors do not necessarily 
allocate their aid in accordance with the pro-poor growth rhetoric by targeting the poor 
and needy. Their argument somewhat discounts that of ours, as well as those from 
previous studies which attribute the relationship between aid and inequality to moral 
hazards on recipient side. 
Using infant mortality, life expectancy, and primary schooling as indicators of the 
improvement of economic conditions of the poor, Boone (1996) finds no significant 
impact of aid programs on improving welfare and that aid always ends up benefiting 
relatively wealthy population. He concludes that politicians favor the rich over the rest of 
the population. A later study by Layton and Nielson (2009) also agrees, but further 
extends the argument to focus on political aspect of the benefits. In particular, because 
politicians need support from their affluent constituencies to win subsequent elections, 
they manipulate their control over aid resources to pursue favorable transfers for the 
interests of their groups. Despite the argument, Layton and Nielson (2009) find zero to 
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little positive impact of aid on the income inequality in a group of 85 developing and 
transitional countries. This result is similar to what Chong et al. (2009) found (no 
significant results). 
Furthermore, adding to the already low bureaucratic quality in most developing 
countries, aid worsens recipient countries’ accountability to their people. As development 
aid increases resources in the receiving country’s national budget, the government faces 
fewer constraints in its revenue collection efforts, making it unappealing to reforms and 
less accountable to its people (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Knack, 2001). The result 
would be unchanging conditions for the poor. Shafiullah (2011) argues that in many aid 
recipient countries, low-income population with low skills and less education usually 
work in informal economy. As more resources make the recipient government less likely 
to carry out reforms, the poor continue to make ends meet in the informal sector. Through 
such a trajectory, foreign aid poses a larger impact on income inequality. In contradiction 
to the study’s argument, nonetheless, Shafiullah (2011) finds that aid actually reduces 
income inequality, though it has a very minimal impact. 
From the theoretical discussion above, we are able extract our first hypothesis as 
below: 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in aid decreases the income shares of the poor (Q1-Q2) but 
increases the income shares of those in the upper quintiles (Q4-Q5), thereby increasing 
income inequality (Gini coefficient). 
 
The Impact of Tied and Untied Aid on Income Inequality 
In our analysis, we focus our attention on the effects of aid that is tied to specific 
sectors as opposed to those that are not tied to any sectors, i.e. “tied aid” (sectoral aid) vs. 
“untied aid” (non-sectoral aid). The impact of these types on the shape of income 
distribution in recipient countries may vary given different incentives they offer. We did 
not find any studies on the effect of tied and untied aid on income distribution. Yet, 
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previous studies on growth and welfare effect of the transfers may shed some light on the 
overall effects. 
The literature looking at the impact of aid tied to specific purposes is relatively 
scarce compared to that of aid tied to procurement in donor countries. Furthermore, the 
few studies on the topic present mixed results. A recent study by Brown (2012) finds that 
untied aid has a greater impact on pro-poor public expenditure, the spending of which 
often argued to be the most supportive to the poor. Other studies on the issue stipulate the 
effect of tied and untied aid under some conditions, rendering somewhat ambiguous 
conclusions of the impact-positive or negative. For instance, examining the effect of tied 
and untied aid on growth, Neanidis and Varvarigos (2009) find that aid tied to spending 
on productive sectors is more effective than pure lump-sum transfers if, and only if, it is 
volatile as defined by its standard deviation. In particular, they find that when aid is 
volatile, tied aid has positive growth effect whereas untied aid has negative effect.  
On the same topic, Chatterjee, Sakoulis, and Turnovsky (2003) find that while 
untied aid can only lead to increases in consumption and welfare in recipient countries, 
the effect of tied aid is less certain. Depending on structural conditions in recipient 
countries, tied aid can be either helpful or harmful. Tied aid leads to long-run growth and 
provides better benefits than does untied aid if the recipient country is poorly endowed 
with public capital, but it can worsen recipient welfare if otherwise. In a later study, 
Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) take into account three factors: the relative prices of 
consumption and leisure, production externalities, and government fiscal balance, and 
find somewhat similar results. The study concludes that untied aid produces a uniform 
result by increasing welfare of recipient countries in both the short run and long run, but 
tied aid is much more sensitive to the three factors above with respect to its impact. 
Even though previous literature provides some grounds on the impact of tied and 
untied aid on welfare of recipient countries, it does not specifically answer the question 
of which income group benefits the most from the increase in welfare. The reason is the 
welfare level considered in previous research is the overall welfare of recipient countries, 
not of any specific population. Considering the channel of distribution, tied and untied 
aid may induce different kinds of incentives from bureaucrats or local elites in charge of 
aid distribution. In fact, Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) also suggest future research on 
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the topic to take into account the rent-seeking factor of political elites in recipient 
countries to further understand the implication of choosing tied and untied aid. This 
suggestion is closely linked to the focus of our study. 
Needless to say, if we consider incentives provided by each aid type, tied aid may 
be better targeted aid than untied. When aid is earmarked for specific sectors, especially 
social sectors through which the poor can absorb more benefits, we expect that such aid 
contributes more to improving the living conditions of the poor. The reason is the 
requirements attached with tied aid is that it has to be allocated to productive sectors 
reducing the chances that bureaucrats or politicians divert aid monies away from the 
intended purposes. We continue this line of thinking as we review the studies that 
examine the relationship between aid types and moral hazard.   
Recent studies find that donors use tied aid to control moral hazard behavior on 
the recipient side. For instance, studying the composition of aid transfers and moral 
hazard, Ouattara et al. (2009, 2013) find that donors actually use restricted transfers in 
response to changes in recipient country moral hazard behavior. Specifically, Ouattara et 
al. (2013) analyze, both theoretically and empirically, how donor response to moral 
hazard behavior by using project aid and program aid to proxy for restricted aid and 
unrestricted aid, respectively. The study finds that as moral hazard in recipient countries 
declines, donors also reduce the provision of tied aid in their portfolio. The authors argue 
that while recipient governments can misappropriate either part or all of program aid, it 
cannot misappropriate project aid; consequently, smaller proportions of program aid, as 
compared to that of project aid, is spent on welfare of the people in recipient countries. 
This suggests that tied aid can be more beneficial to the poor because donors use tied aid 
to control for such moral hazard behavior. 
Nonetheless, fungibility literature suggests that aid intended for specific sectors 
(e.g., building roads, healthcare centers etc.) can be very fungible (see, for 
example,(Feyzioglu et al., 1998; Khilji & Zampelli, 1991, 1994; Pettersson, 2007b). Most 
studies on the impact of tied aid argue that recipient governments can be manipulative in 
their resource allocation by reallocating aid earmarked for specific sectors to fund other 
uses that donors are neither funding, nor have any knowledge of. In particular, it can 
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reduce its own-source funding from aid funded sectors and reallocate the resources to 
fund others, e.g. from aid funded the education sector to military spending. Even so, 
fungibility would not be as bad as it sounds if the relocated resources are used to finance 
other sectors that provide better or at least as equal returns as the intended sectors. It 
would be damaging though if the resources are used for “the conspicuous consumption of 
the elite” (World Bank, 1998, p. 73). In such cases, tied aid is benefiting the elites, not 
the intended recipients. Indeed, a model by Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (2000) predicts 
that fungibility shifts aid resources away from the targeted group toward special interest 
groups lobbying the government. 
To the extent that the very nature of untied aid makes it legally fungible (Brown, 
2012), thus more prone to moral hazard, tied aid is still better targeted despite its 
fungibility. We, therefore, argue that untied aid carries higher moral hazard in the 
allocation than tied aid, which can lead to allocation favoring officials and the elites 
handling the resources. 
 
2.2.4.2 The Role of Institutions in Income Distribution 
Literature of institutions and development that has attempted to answer the 
questions of institutional differences across countries provides extensive explanations to 
the link between institutions and income inequality. The work of Acemoglu and his 
colleagues often provide insights into the importance of institutions in the development in 
a society. The literature mainly stresses the way in which institutions have emerged and 
evolved since the colonial era. For instance, in their recent work, Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) provide an account for the differences of income inequality among 
nations particularly between North and South America. The authors postulate that during 
colonial times, new settlers set themselves up as elites for the native populations. They 
grabbed land, implemented forced labor, imposed high taxes, and enjoyed their fortune at 
the cost of the rest. In a very direct and repressive way, the institutions brought about by 
the newcomers created much inequality among the rich and the poor in Latin America. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that even though the continent saw some changes 
to institutions in the later years, the changes were “path-dependent” that lead only to 
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another form of the same repressive institutions (p. 36). This aspect of institutional 
persistence is also discussed in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008), Congdon Fors and Olsson (2007), and Cervellati et al. (2008)9. 
Apart from the historical account of institutions as mentioned above, different 
dimensions of institutions affect income inequality. One dimension is corruption. 
Corruption is a feature of informal institutions and norms enforced through interpersonal 
ties and relations. Corruption may emerge in different patterns depending on elite types. 
As noted in Johnston (1989), the political and wealth elites with strong grip on their 
positions are more likely to use corruption to keep their power, whereas those with 
relatively insecure hold on their power use a somewhat rapacious way of corrupting 
while in power. In any pattern of corruption, it affects the lives of many. 
Previous studies of the impact of corruption on inequality seem be mixed but lean 
towards to the conclusion that more corruption is associated with higher inequality. 
Corruption affects income inequality through several channels; biasing tax system in 
favor of the rich and well-connected, diverting public spending away from social 
programs, creating unequal access to education, and concentrating assets among wealthy 
elites (Apergis, Dincer, & Payne, 2010; Gupta, Davoodi, et al., 2002; Gyimah-Brempong 
& de Camacho, 2006). Furthermore, corruption diverts investments away from labor-
intensive-sectors (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), limiting the opportunity of some social groups 
to generate income. Since those in the low-income group usually have less education and 
work mostly in labor intensive sectors, fewer job opportunities implies further 
suppression in income. 
Studying the effect of corruption on income distribution using both Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) and Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) methods, Gupta, Davoodi, et al. 
(2002) find that an increase in corruption increases income inequality and reduces income 
growth of the bottom 20% of population (quintile 1). To be specific, a one-standard 
deviation increase in corruption increases Gini coefficient by 11 points and decreases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The arguments of how institutions persist are contradicting at best. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2008) argue that elites can stay in power by investing in defacto power, whereas Cervellati et al. (2008) 
defend the persistence of political institutions on the “the possibility of curtailing conflict and preserving 
good economic institutions” (p. 1355). 
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income growth of the poor by 4.7 percentage points per year. Considering the average 
Gini coefficient at 39 and the growth of income of the poor at 0.6 percent per year in their 
study, the results suggest that corruption has a considerable impact on inequality. Their 
results are highly significant and robust to different specifications. In a similar line of 
research, Gyimah-Brempong (2002) finds that corruption is associated with higher 
income inequality in a sample of 21 African nations. Their results are significant at the 5% 
level and robust to estimation methodology. In an extended paper, Gyimah-Brempong 
and de Camacho (2006) further find significant regional differences of the impact. Latin 
America presents the highest negative impact followed by the African, Asian, and OECD 
countries. 
Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) find the same relationship, except that it follows an 
inverted U-shape curve. Employing both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation techniques, Li et al. (2000) find a quadratic relationship with a 
positive coefficient on the linear corruption variable and a negative coefficient on its 
squared term, suggesting that inequality rises as corruption increases, with a decrease 
starting after reaching a turning point. The literature also identifies the bidirectional effect 
of institutions and inequality: they determine each other, creating a trap of poor 
institutions and high inequality (Apergis et al., 2010; Chong & Gradstein, 2007). 
In contradiction to Li et al. (2000) though, using OLS and IV techniques on data 
from 105 rich and poor countries from 1982 to 1995, Chong and Calderón (2000) find a 
hump shaped relationship between quality of institutions and income inequality, 
suggesting that better institutions that come with reforms are associated with higher 
inequality before reaching its later stages. Their sample suggests that while richer 
countries enjoy more equal distribution from better institutions, poorer countries suffer 
from the effect, which prompts income to shift away from the poor. The authors argue 
that this could be the case when informal and underground sectors within where the 
majority of poor works dominate the economy. Lower corruption, new restrictions and 
norms, and better-trained bureaucrats to implement the rules, are more likely to add 
burdens to the informal economy that runs on the realm of underground transactions. 
Their results are significant and robust to different institutional measurements. Note that 
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one of their institutional indices comprises of five institutional dimensions, three of 
which are used in our study. 
A series of studies motivated by Chong and Calderón (2000) seem to support their 
findings. Examining the relationship between corruption and inequality from 1984 to 
2003, Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010) find a trade-off between corruption and 
inequality suggesting that lower corruption leads to higher income inequality in a sample 
of 19 Latin American countries, whose economies are heavily dependent on informal 
sector. The result is confirmed in their extended studies (Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson 
(2011); Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012)). 
On the other hand, literature on corruption also points to a list of factors that 
contribute to higher corruption: the way in which law is administered and enforced, lack 
of independent judicial system, lack of transparency and accountability, and low salary of 
civil servants (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Rothstein, 2011; Treisman, 2000). This suggests 
that bureaucratic quality and the rule of law are also the causes of corruption. Thus, 
bureaucratic quality and the rule of law determine how resources are distributed among 
social groups through its effects on corruption. We do not find any empirical studies on 
the impact of bureaucratic quality and the rule of law on inequality, except in work by 
Chong and Calderón (2000) as discussed above. Theoretical contributions though may 
shed some light on the relationship. As previous literature demonstrates that bureaucracy 
plays a central role in decision making (Huber, 2000; Tirole, 1994), including resource 
distribution. A model by Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007) predicts that bureaucrats 
with redistributive authority conspire with the wealthy in concealing information to 
receive private bribes. Low bureaucratic capacity is another constraint in policy 
implementation (Huber & McCarty, 2004). When the poor depend mostly on public 
provisions of goods and services, any constraints in the provisions would limit their 
access to the services. Taken together, lower quality of bureaucracy can lead to higher 
income inequality. 
The rule of law affects inequality through a means of control on corruption, 
oversee private capture, and checks on government. Weak rule of law thus provides 
incentive for bureaucrats to capture rents for personal gain. Among various mechanisms 
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to fight corruption, punishment of corrupt officials is actually an effective tool to curb on 
corruption (Gupta, Davoodi, et al., 2002). Indeed, the likelihood that someone will be 
punished for corruption is negatively related to the number of corrupt officials (Easterly, 
2001). The threat of punishment forces bureaucrats to shy away from pursuing their 
personal benefits, making the redistribution of resources towards elites and the public 
embezzlement less likely, hence lower inequality. 
Taken together, the distributional impact of aid and the impact of institutions on 
inequality, as well as the link between institutions and aid distribution discussed in 
Section 2.2.2 provides supports for the claim that the distribution of aid would be better 
allocated to its intended targets, which generally are the poor, if provided to countries 
with strong institutional base. We thus are able to construct the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: The poor benefit more from aid in better institutional setting. 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of aid on income inequality is smaller for recipient 
countries with better institutional quality. 
 
Also, we expect that both tied and untied aid can reach the poor more if allocated 
in countries with better institutions. Good institutions lead to better monitoring and 
management and less rent-seeking. 
Note that Chong et al. (2009) also study how aid affects income inequality, but 
only analyze the effect on Gini coefficient conditional on corruption. Exploring the 
impact of aid from 1971 to 2002 using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
procedure, Chong et al. (2009) find no evidence that corruption is a significant 
determinant in aid distribution. Similarly, Bjornskov (2010) examines the effect of aid on 
income distribution, as measured by income quintiles, conditional on democracy, which 
arguably is a form of government that provides higher checks and balances. Employing 
random effects feasible least squares estimator to explore the beneficiary of foreign aid in 
88 developing countries from 1960 to 2000, Bjornskov (2010) finds that an increase in 
aid is associated with an income skewed toward the richest segment of the population in 
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democracy and not in autocracy. The results are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
significance level and robust to different sample restrictions. The author is baffled about 
his findings, but provides several reasons why this is the case, two of which are: (1) aid 
inflow might fail democratic policy, and (2) aid might be associated with rent-seeking 
during the transition to democracy. 
In this study, we build upon the work of Chong et al. (2009) and Bjornskov (2010) 
by exploring both the impact of aid on income share captured by each quintile and on 
income inequality conditional on a wider aspects of institutions—corruption, bureaucratic 
quality, and the rule of law. 
 
2.2.4.3 Reverse Causality 
Because causality can run in both directions between aid and income inequality, it 
is not uncommon that the analysis can be complicated. While aid inflow may change the 
pattern of income distribution in the long run, income inequality also determines aid 
volume. For instance, donors may reward countries with less inequality by providing 
more aid for their successful efforts in reducing poverty. Another possibility is countries 
with high income inequality may keep receiving more aid because a large proportion of 
its population lives in poverty (Herzer & Nunnenkamp, 2012; Layton & Nielson, 2009). 
Also, an inflow of aid to a specific country may persist despite high inequality because 
the country is one of donor’s strategic interests. As a consensus of the literature of aid 
selectivity, the allocation of aid is based not only on humanitarian, but also on donors’ 
strategic interests. For that same reason, the level of income inequality in a recipient 
country may be irrelevant to the amount of aid it receives. Although the primary causal 
link will be the impact of aid on income inequality, there are reasons to believe that 
causality can go either way between aid and income inequality. 
Previous aid research attempts to solve this reverse causal impact by using 
instrumental variables. Some popular instrumental variables used, particularly in aid and 
growth literature, include: arms imports, population, infant mortality, and regional 
dummies to capture donors’ strategic interests. In selecting which instruments to use, we 
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must acknowledge that it is not easy to identify one (or a set of) good instrumental 
variable(s) for aid and that most literature reports the results despite poor econometric 
tests. In this study, we discuss our choice of instruments in detail in the data and 
methodology section. 
 
2.2.5 Other Variables to Consider 
This section briefly describes a set of control variables used in our study. The 
variables are commonly used in previous literature, those include: 
 
Kuznets curve 
As in much of income inequality determinant literature, this study includes GDP 
per capita and its squared term to test the classical Kuznets hypothesis of an inverted U-
shape relationship between GDP and income inequality. Kuznets (1955) postulates that 
the degree of income inequality increases as a country develops, but then begins to 
decrease after reaching a certain level. In essence, growing inequality is inevitable in a 
growing economy because some are more equipped to reap the growing opportunity than 
others. Until the rest can slowly take advantage of the opportunity that the level of 
inequality dwindles. This study also tries to capture the existence of the Kuznets curve. 
       
Education  
Education plays a significant role in determining the degree of income inequality. 
Education provides opportunity for the poor to escape from poverty by offering them 
better chances into higher paying jobs. According to Martinez-Vazquez, Vulovic, and Liu 
(2010), however, it is not clear whether education increases or decreases income 
inequality. The reason is the return to education can only be captured by those with 
education; thus when education expands, income inequality also widened, particularly in 
poor countries where low level of education is a norm. However, as more and more 
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people acquire education, the return to education decreases, leading to lower inequality. 
Gupta, Davoodi, et al. (2002), however, find no significant results of the inequality effect 
of education, as measured by average years of secondary schooling in their study. 
 
Rural population 
Poverty is highly concentrated in the rural areas where most are subsistence 
farmers. Rural inhabitants mostly earn their living on agricultural-based activities or on 
household farming. They have fewer opportunities to gain income from other non-farm 
activities. Therefore, the differences in income inequality may be attributable to the 
differences in share of population living in rural area. Bjornskov (2010) finds that income 
share captured by the lowest four quintiles is significantly lower for countries with larger 
share of population in the rural areas. Conversely, using share of urban population instead 
of share of rural population, Chong and Calderón (2000) find no evidence of the 
relationship between the share of urban population and income inequality. 
 
Openness 
A general argument to the effect of trade openness on income distribution posits 
that only small groups of the population who are already well-off are able to gain the 
benefits from trade openness and globalization. This view runs contrary to the standard 
trade theory, which argues that the effect of openness on income inequality depends upon 
the country’s resources endowment (Barro, 2000). Empirical work has not yet reaching 
an understanding of the consensus of the effect of openness on income inequality. Barro 
(2000) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2010) find that trade openness widens income 
inequality, while Reuveny and Li (2003) find the opposite. Some other works do not find 
any significant impact (Bjornskov, 2010; Li et al., 2000). 
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Inflation 
There seems to be a consensus of a positive relationship between inflation and 
income inequality (Cysne, Maldonado, & Monteiro, 2005). Inflation increases the level 
of income inequality because it affects the poor harder. Much of the poor’s income goes 
to consumption, while the rich can diversify their income on different sectors, for 
instance on property such as land or capital (Layton & Nielson, 2009). In the midst of 
high inflation, the low-income population is inevitably the core victims. 
 
Survey Type 
Most research on income inequality utilizes income distribution data from surveys 
conducted using different conceptual measurement of income, i.e. consumption based or 
income based. Income based data are more likely to present higher inequality than 
consumption based one. Since income inequality varies depending on measurement of 
income used in each survey, this study also includes a variable survey type to control for 
the differences. The variable captures the magnitude of the conceptual measurement of 
each quintile and Gini coefficient. 
 
2.3 Data and Methodology 
This section of the analysis reiterates the hypotheses drawn from the theoretical 
discussion above, presents the empirical model, data sources, and describes the empirical 
methodology. 
 
Hypotheses 
Formed along the discussion in the literature review, our three hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in aid decreases the income shares of the poor (Q1-Q2) but 
increases the income shares of those in the upper quintiles (Q4-Q5), thereby increasing 
income inequality (Gini coefficient). 
Hypothesis 2: The poor benefit more from aid in better institutional setting. 
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Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of aid on income inequality is smaller for recipient 
countries with better institutional quality. 
In order to test the above hypotheses, this study employs a model that has been 
widely used by previous literature of conditional aid and growth nexus. In the aid 
effectiveness literature, the variable considered as “condition” enters into the estimation 
equation through second order condition, which means that aid is multiplied by the 
variable called “condition” (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2010). As for the estimations, this 
study employs Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method to control for potential reverse 
causality that can go between income inequality and aid. We discuss the choice of 
instruments for aid in a section below. 
Modified from Dietrich (2011) and following the standard model of aid 
effectiveness literature, the model of conditional impact of aid can be written as: 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" + 𝛽!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!"                                                         +𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!" + 𝛾!! +𝜀!!"                                              (1) 𝐴𝑖𝑑!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑍!" + 𝛼!𝑋!" + 𝜀!!"                 (2) 𝐴𝑖𝑑!" ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" = 𝛺! + 𝛺!𝑍!" + 𝛺!𝑋!" + 𝜀!!"         (3) 
 
Where i indexes countries and t indexes time. 𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!"    denotes the share of 
income captured by each income group (Q1-Q5) and Gini coefficient. 𝐴𝑖𝑑!" represents 
the measure of aid relative to GDP. 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" measures the institutional quality. 𝐴𝑖𝑑 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" is the interaction term between aid and institutions which captures 
the joint effects of aid and institutions on income inequality. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!"	  is a vector of 
exogenous variables commonly found to be important in explaining the variation of 
income inequality. The control variables include two variables that capture the Kuznets 
curve, percent of population living in rural area, trade openness, inflation, average years 
of schooling, and survey type, which captures conceptual measurement of income 
distribution. 𝑍!" are the excluded instruments, and 𝑋!" are the included instruments. 𝛾! is 
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fixed-time effect to control for global business cycle or other common time effects. For 
instance, a group of countries may attract aid flow into their countries concurrently due to 
several reasons such as natural disasters, regional war, or famine, while at the same time 
globalization of trade and investment may affect income inequality for a group of 
countries (Herzer & Nunnenkamp, 2012). Finally, 𝜀!" is the error term. 
We use Equation (1) without the interaction term, Aid*Institutions, to test 
hypothesis 1 and that with the interaction term to test hypotheses 2 and 3. When 
Aid*Institutions is not in the model, we expect the sign on the Aid coefficient to be 
negative in equation where Q1 and Q2 are dependent variables as we hypothesize that 
income shares of the poor decrease when aid increases. When the interaction 
Aid*Institutions presents, however, we expect to see positive coefficients on 
Aid*Institutions as we hypothesize that aid increases the portion of income held by the 
poor if given to countries with good institutional quality. On the contrary, we expect to 
see negative signs on the coefficient of Aid*Institutions in equations where Q4 and Q5 
are dependent variables. As a result, in the Gini coefficient equation, the study expects 
the sign of the coefficient on Aid*Institutions  to be negative, indicating that the positive 
effect of aid on inequality is less in countries where institutions is of better quality. 
 
General Data and Countries Included 
This study uses data from 85 countries collected from 1960 to 2004. The research 
follows Rajan and Subramanian (2008) in selecting countries to include in the analysis, 
contingent upon data availability. Regardless of the income status a country is currently 
in, the country is selected based on the criteria that it had/has received foreign aid at least 
once during the period 1960 and 2004. By using this selection criterion, high-income 
countries are also included in our sample. See Appendix A for the list of countries.  
As in many income inequality studies, the research uses a five-year average in the 
analysis (see, for example,(Bjornskov, 2010; Davis & Hopkins, 2011; Li et al., 2000). 
The advantage of having our variables averaged over a five-year period is that it can 
reduce the short-run fluctuations, business cycle factors, and measurement error, allowing 
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us to focus on the structural relationships of interest (Boone, 1996; Li et al., 2000). In 
addition, since the inequality data does not change drastically over a short period of time, 
the method of averaging does not appear to be that big of an issue. Thus, an observation 
for a country in a time period is the average of the corresponding observations for that 
five-year time period. For example, an X observation is the average of X in Year 1, Year 
2, Year 3, Year 4, and Year 5. However, because not all variables are available for all 
countries in all time periods, the actual number of observations in our regressions is far 
smaller than the perfect scenario of full dataset. 
 
Dependent Variables (Income Quintiles and Gini Coefficient) 
The dependent variables in our study are the share of income held by each income 
group (Q1-Q5) and the Gini coefficient. Each quintile captures the percentage of income 
attributable to each fifth of the population, with Q1 being the poorest population and Q5 
being the richest population. Gini coefficient is a measure inequality in a society, which 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 being the perfect equal society and 1 being the perfect unequal 
society. 
As in much income inequality research, the data on income distribution and 
income inequality derives from the World Income Inequality Database of the United 
Nations (UNU-WIDER, 2008), which comes from various surveys of different quality. 
The quality of the surveys is based on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 being the highest quality 
and 4 being the poorest quality. In some cases, the data contains different surveys for one 
observation. In such cases, this study chooses to use the one with the highest survey 
quality. Furthermore, surveys included are based on different measurement concepts such 
as gross income, net income, consumption or expenditure. Even though the UNU-
WIDER data set is a mix of different surveys and sources, the data is homogenized to 
account for different definitions (Chong et al., 2009). As also pointed out in Hansen, 
Rants, and Buhl-Wiggers (2010), we understand that data quality is one of the main 
concerns in any cross country analysis; however, since the data set comes from a 
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homogenized database and has been used by many studies, the use of the data set can 
provide results at least comparable to others. 
 
Main Independent Variables (Aid and Institutions Index) 
The main explanatory variable in our analysis is aid. Aid is defined as the net 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursement as a percentage of GDP. This 
study uses aggregate aid because of its wide availability and how common it is in 
previous aid literature (see, for example,(Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Hansen & Tarp, 2001). 
The aid data covers aid volume from all official sources of both bilateral and multilateral 
donors.  
Additionally, we disaggregate aid into tied and untied aid. As notated in Section 
2.2.3, the common form of tied aid is the tying of aid to procurement in donor countries, 
but in our study tied aid refers to the tying of aid to specific development sectors. We use 
share of sectoral aid to GDP and share of non-sectoral aid to GDP as proxies for tied 
and untied aid, respectively. Tied aid is tied to different productive sectors in supports for 
development; those include aid allocated to social and economic infrastructure and 
services, production services, and multi-sector or crosscutting sector. On the other hand, 
untied aid are non-sectoral allocable such as general budget support, food security 
assistance, other commodity assistance, and action relating to debt. The source of all aid 
data is from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development online 
database (OECD, 2012a, 2012b), whereas that of GDP is from World Development 
Indicator (World Bank, 2010). OECD database comprises of two major databases—
Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) database and Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS) Aid Activities database. We extract our aggregated aid data from DAC database, 
but we have to resort to using CRS database for tied and untied aid. The reason is only 
CRS database reports sectoral composition of aid. A major drawback of using CRS 
database, however, is that CRS does not report the actual aid disbursement, but 
commitment. The use of commitment amount can either understate or overstate the actual 
disbursement amount. Since CRS is the only source of data for sectoral aid allocation, we 
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follow previous studies and assume that the committed amount is 100% disbursed and it 
is also disbursed in the same year when the commitment is made (for similar assumption 
see(Brown, 2012). To obtain the amount of all aid as a percentage of GDP, we divide aid 
data in current units with GDP in current units. 
With respect to another main independent variable, institutions, the study utilizes 
three most commonly used institutional variables: 1. Corruption, 2. Rule of Law, and 3. 
Bureaucratic Quality. As Burnside and Dollar (2000) also note, if we interact each 
institutional variable simultaneously with the aid term in Equation (1), we find it difficult 
to get precise estimations of the interactive terms. Therefore, we follow many previous 
aid studies and construct an institutional index from the three institutional variables. We 
utilize the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the first eigenvalue of the 
three dimensions. We use PCA because it produces better weights compared to simple 
average and it can also account for as much of the variances of the three institutional 
dimensions. 
The source of our institutional data is from the International Country Risk Guide 
published by the Political Risk Services group (PRS Group, 2008), a private firm 
providing risk assessments to businesses. The institutional measures provide expert 
assessments of the quality of institutions based on a range of predetermined criteria 
across countries. A drawback of using such perception rating is that there may be biases 
in experts’ judgments. However, the institutional indices produced by the PRS group are 
commonly used in the literature, particularly because of its wide coverage (up to 130 
countries) and uninterrupted annual data for a relatively long time period. The data is 
available from 1984 to the end of our sample year, 2004. To take advantage of wide 
availability of inequality data, which is available from 1960, the study uses the first 
available observation of the institutional variable to substitute for the missing period prior 
to 1984, based primarily on the assumption that institutions do not change drastically 
over time. Corruption and the rule of law measures take values from 0 (most corrupt or 
worst rule of law) to 6 (least corrupt or best rule of law). Quality of the bureaucracy, on 
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the other hand, takes values from 0 (worst bureaucratic quality) to 4 (best bureaucratic 
quality)10. 
 
Control Variables 
As mentioned in the literature review section, several other variables are 
important determinants of income distribution and inequality. In this study, we also 
control for those that include variables capturing the existence of the Kuznets curve, rural 
population, openness to trade, inflation, average years of schooling, and survey type.  
The study uses log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) and its squared value 
to capture the inverted U-shape of the Kuznets curve. Rural population is the percentage 
of people living in rural areas, as defined by national statistical offices in each country. 
As in previous studies (e.g., Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) and Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson 
(2012)), openness to trade is the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. 
Another control variable is inflation rate, based on annual percentage change in consumer 
price index. Our education variable measures the average schooling years of the total 
population aged 15 and over. We also control for “survey type.” As already noted, our 
income inequality data comes from different surveys that are either “income-based” or 
“consumption-based.” In this study, we code “income-based” as 0 and “consumption-
based” as 1. Since an observation is a five-year average of its correspondent observations, 
our “survey type” variable captures the magnitude of the surveys that are “consumption-
based.” The source of data for all variables, except education, is from World 
Development Indicator (World Bank, 2010). Education data is from Barro and Lee (2000) 
which is available periodically, i.e. 1960, 1965, 1970 and so on. See Appendix B for 
variable descriptions and sources. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 According to the PRS group, corruption measures the degree of corruption prevailing in a country which 
is concerned with “actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and 
business”. The rule of law assesses “the strength and impartiality of the legal system; [..] and popular 
observance of the law”. Bureaucratic quality measures “the strength and expertise to govern without drastic 
changes in policy or interruptions in government services; [..] and an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training”. Source: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_methodology.aspx 
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Instrumental Variables 
To control for potential reverse causality between aid and income inequality, the 
study employs a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) procedure for the estimation. We have 
to acknowledge that the results of previous aid effectiveness literature are somewhat 
limited to finding right instruments for aid. Previous literature provides some different 
choices of instruments. In this study, we use a set of instrumental variables informed by 
aid selectivity literature. Those include: log of total population, Franc zone, Central 
American countries, and Egypt dummies. 
Past studies on aid allocation show that, on average, smaller countries, as defined 
by its population, receive higher aid volume (see, for example,(Clist, 2011; Fink & 
Redaelli, 2011). Kosack (2003) notates two reasons why this can be the case. First, it is 
likely that donors would want their limited resources to have the most impact per person, 
thus giving aid to a smaller country with fewer populations would allow them to achieve 
their goal. Secondly, since the practice of aid giving is based on country level (e.g. donor 
A gives X amount of aid to country B), not people, the allocation of aid to different 
countries may provide more advantage to countries with smaller population than those 
with bigger ones. The source of data for “total population” is from World Development 
Indicator (World Bank, 2010). 
Aid allocation literature also suggests that alongside recipient’s need, donors also 
consider whether the country has any strategic value to them (see, for example,(Alesina 
& Dollar, 2000; Dreher et al., 2011; Harrigan & Wang, 2011). Three dummy variables 
often used to capture strategic importance are: Egypt, Central America, and Franc zone 
dummies. Egypt is a major US aid recipient. Central American countries are also in the 
US sphere of influence. Franc zone are former French colonies that continue to receive 
aid from the EU, especially from France (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Hansen & Tarp, 
2001). In our sample, eight countries are in Franc zone: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote 
d'Ivore, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Senegal; and six countries are Central 
American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvado, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama. 
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The potential weakness of our instrumental variables, especially the three regional 
dummies, is their possible correlation with the error term in the main regression, i.e. 
while explaining the volume of aid a country receives, the level of inequality can be 
related. Specifically, as the literature on the connections between institutions and 
inequality suggests countries included in these regional dummies are former colonies in 
which their level of inequality today is shaped by their colonial experience. Because of 
this reason, being one of the countries in the regions already presents a certain level of 
income inequality, violating the basis requirement that instrumental variables should 
affect inequality only through its effect on aid. The alternative sets of instrumental 
variables used in previous studies include: lagged value of aid and dummies captures the 
political determinants of aid flows, such as Friends of US, Friends of OPEC, and Friends 
of France (see, for example,(Boone, 1996); lagged value of the ratio of ODA 
disbursements to ODA commitments and distance from recipient country’s national 
capital to Paris, Tokyo and Washington (see, for example,(McGillivray et al., 2011); 
General Assembly voting patterns and presence of countries in the Security Council (see, 
for example,(Bjornskov, 2010); dummies for Development Bank membership, such as 
the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the International Development Association, and the Asian Development 
Bank (see, for example,(Layton & Nielson, 2009); and dummies for common land border, 
common official language, and common majority religion (see, for example,(Angeles & 
Neanidis, 2009). Similar to the instrumental variables used in our study, though, each set 
of instruments has its potential weaknesses. 
Since we use instrumental variable technique, we carry out tests for exogeneity 
and for the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. The study utilizes the F-test to 
determine the relevance of the excluded instruments, through which we can conclude 
whether the instruments are providing predictive power in the first-stage regression. The 
null hypothesis of the F-test is that the instruments do not explain any cross-country 
variation in the aid regression in Equation (2). We follow the rule of thumb suggested by 
Staiger and Stock (1997) which requires that the F-statistics should be higher than 10. 
Then, the study considers another specification test—Hansen’s J test of overidentifying 
restriction—to examine the overall validity of the instruments. The null hypothesis for 
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Hansen test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in 
Equation (1), and that the estimated Equation (1) has correctly excluded them. Generally, 
the null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments are valid instruments.   
The summary statistics, based on a five-year average, of the variables included in 
our models is presented in Table 2.1. If we had a full data set with no missing value, we 
would have up to 765 observations from 85 countries observed over 9 time periods. 
However, due to data limitations, we have a very unbalanced data set with a lot of 
missing values; thus, the highest possible number of observations is only 414. As shown 
in Table 2.1, the maximum income captured by the top quintile (Q5) is as high as 78% of 
total income, whereas the income share captured by the lowest quintile is as low as 1.1%. 
A few countries where the top quintile hold more than 70% of total income include 
Gabon (in the 1960s), Ecuador (in the 1970s), and Gambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and 
Lesotho (in the 1990s). As a result, Gini coefficient in our sample ranges from 21.8% to 
73.9%, which represents a fairly unequal society to a very unequal one.  
On aid variable, aid volume ranges from -0.022 % of GDP to 51.4% of GDP with 
the mean of 4.2%. Because Aid is net ODA disbursement as a percentage of GDP, 
negative net aid signifies that a country receives less amount of aid than its loan 
repayment. Countries with negative aid as a percentage of GDP include Peru in the 1960s, 
Chile in the 1980s, and Malaysia and the Republic of Korea in the 1990s. The percentage 
of tied aid to GDP is generally higher than that of untied aid, with the mean value of 2.9% 
and the maximum value of 24.8% of GDP. The mean and maximum values of untied aid 
are relatively lower at 1.4% and 19.5% of GDP, respectively. The relatively lower level 
of untied aid as compared to tied one indicates somehow that aid is mostly given to 
support development sectors. Note also that due to data limitations, commitment amounts 
are coupled to both tied and untied aid, which can be different from actual aid 
disbursement. 
Since countries included in the analysis are from low-income economies to high-
income ones, our institutional scores also spread from the lowest possible ratings to the 
highest ones, with the exception of bureaucratic quality where the minimum score is 0.8. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the three institutional scores combined is 0.748. Countries with no 
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rural population are Hong Kong and Singapore; those with high concentrations of rural 
population are mostly African countries including Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Niger, and 
Uganda, where more than 90% of population live in rural areas at one period during our 
time span. The “average years of schooling” has the lowest number of observations in our 
sample with the maximum value of about 10 years. 
Turning to variable correlations in Table 2.2, most of our variables are not highly 
correlated. Though, we notice a few interesting points from the relationships. While the 
first through the fourth quintiles tend to move in the same direction, the fifth quintile is 
negatively related from the previous four. As a result, Gini coefficient is strongly and 
positively related only with the top quintile (fifth quintile). With respect to the correlation 
between our aid variables, we are not surprised to see very high correlations between our 
aggregate, tied, and untied aid; the correlations of which are more than 0.8. The 
correlations between all aid types and income inequality (Q1-Q5 and Gini coefficient) are 
very low. 
As it pertains to the three variables that make up our institutional index (i.e. 
corruption, the rule of law, and quality of bureaucracy), the variables are positively 
correlated. From the relationships, we may expect a country with better control on 
corruption to also have high scores on the rule of law and bureaucratic quality; though the 
relationships are not particularly strong. All aid variables are negatively, but very weakly, 
related with the three institutional variables. The correlations suggest that countries with 
poor institutional quality are not always major aid recipients. Last but not least, GDP per 
capita, percentage of people living in rural area, and average years of schooling are 
somewhat highly correlated, with a negative correlation between GDP per capita and 
rural population, and a positive correlation between GDP per capita and average 
schooling years. This may imply that countries with high GDP per capita tend to have 
smaller population living in the rural area and their people tend to obtain more years of 
schooling. On the contrary, the correlations between GDP per capita and all aid types are 
negatives, but again the relationship is not strong, suggesting that poorer countries do not 
always receive more aid. 
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2.4 Results 
We begin the analysis of the impact of aid and institutions on all five quintiles and 
Gini coefficient with OLS regressions, which is followed by 2SLS. Table 2.3 presents 
regression estimates of the full model using OLS. The first columns (Column 1) under 
each quintile and Gini coefficient in Table 2.3 present results of the estimates without the 
interaction terms, Aid*Institutions, whereas the second columns (Column 2) present 
results of the models with the interaction terms. As Column 1 in Table 2.3 show, the 
coefficients on aid are negatively and significantly related to Q1 through Q4, but only 
those in Q1 and Q2 are significantly different from zero. In contrast, aid is significantly 
and positively related to Q5, which is the income share of the elites in each country. By 
reducing income shares of Q1 and Q2 and increasing that of Q5, aid increases Gini 
coefficient. This can be seen through the significant coefficient on Aid in Gini coefficient 
regression. Analyzing the results from an institutional standpoint, none of the coefficient 
on Institutions is significant, suggesting that institutions are not important determinants of 
income distribution. Similarly, in Column 2, where we introduce the interactive term into 
the models, none of the coefficients on Aid*Institutions is significant, suggesting that the 
impact of aid on income distribution does not differ with different institutions. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned in the methodology section, causality can go either way 
between aid and inequality; thus, we need to take into account the potential reverse 
causality by using 2SLS. 
Table 2.4 presents regression estimates using 2SLS where each additional control 
variable is added to the models. Each column under each quintile and Gini coefficient 
shows regression result corresponding to each additional control variable. The last two 
columns thus, Column 5 and Column 6, are the results of the full models on which we 
focus. As each control variable enters the model, the number of observations reduces, 
leading to a much smaller observation in the full models. The results are presented in  
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parallel so that the impact can be seen clearly with each additional control11. 
We approach the analysis using 2SLS with a more general picture of the impact 
by examining the regressions without the interaction terms Aid*Institutions (i.e., Column 
1 through Column 5). As Table 2.4 indicates, the estimators in each model have almost 
the same results with respect to both sign and significance of coefficients. To be exact, 
the coefficients on Aid are negatively and significantly related to Q1 and Q2 in all 
columns. Similarly, the signs on aid coefficients in Q3 are also negative; however, the 
coefficient loses its significance after controlling for all variables. The aid coefficients in 
Q4 regressions are negative in all cases, but in Column 5. Furthermore, none of the 
coefficients are significant, except that in Column 3 where the significance is only at the 
10% level. Finally, aid is significantly and positively related to Q5, the elites’ income 
share, and also to Gini coefficient. In general, by reducing the income shares of Q1 and 
Q2 while at the same time increasing that of Q5, aid increases Gini coefficient. 
On the other hand, the effects of institutions on income inequality are somewhat 
inconsistent with respect to the signs of coefficients, with the exceptions in Q3, Q4, and 
Q5 regressions. Negative signs on Institutions in Q3 and Q4, and positive sign on that in 
Q5 suggest that as institutional quality improves income shares of Q3 and Q4 decrease 
while that of Q5 increases. The relationships contradict our expectation, but are in line 
with some corruption and inequality studies. Chong and Calderón (2000) and Dobson and 
Ramlogan-Dobson (2010) find that better institutions are associated with higher 
inequality at the early stage of development and with lower inequality at the later stage. 
Since countries in our sample are mostly developing countries, these countries most 
likely depend more on the informal sectors where improved institutions widen inequality. 
Nonetheless, as these coefficients are only sparsely significant and significant only at the 
5% level at best. We cannot draw any general conclusion from the relationships. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Of all control variables, the variable “average years of schooling” has the lowest number of observations. 
However, we choose to control for “average years of schooling” first because doing so allows us to get 
better test statistics in addition to more consistent estimators (especially, Rural population, Openness, Log 
inflation). We provide a separate table in Appendix C where each additional control variable is added to the 
regressions in order of its number of observations. In Column 5 and 6 in Appendix C, where “average years 
of schooling” is added to the final models, coefficients on percentage of rural population, openness, and 
inflation turn significant in most cases, suggesting that the variations in income distribution are strongly 
associated with average years of schooling and that the four estimators share significant amount of 
information. 
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We now focus only on the full models in Column 5 under the same Table 2.4. As 
mentioned in the methodology section, we utilize F-statistics from first stage regression 
to determine if our instruments are good predictors of aid, and Hansen J’s statistics of 
excluded instruments to evaluate the overidentification restriction. The F-statistics from 
first stage regressions are all exceed the rule of thumb level of 10, suggesting that our 
excluded instruments—log of population and the regional dummies—are good predictors 
of aid level. However, if we examine Hansen’s J statistics, the tests do cast some doubts 
on the validity of instruments due to its low power. Therefore, we need to interpret our 
coefficients with caution. 
In Table 2.4 under Column 5, the aid coefficients in Q1 and Q2 regressions are 
negatively and significantly different from zero at the 1% and 5% significance level, 
respectively. This indicates that an increase in aid to GDP by 1% decreases the share of 
income captured by the lowest two quintiles by 0.15% and 0.08%, respectively, holding 
other things constant. In contrast, a 1% increase in aid to GDP increases income share of 
the top quintile, Q5, by 0.27%, consequently widening the gap between the rich and poor, 
Gini coefficient, by 0.46%, all else constant. The coefficients are significant at the 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. The results are consistent with most theoretical and empirical 
studies examining the effect of aid on income inequality and with our hypothesis 1 
arguing that the poor are not the main beneficiary of aid and that aid increases income 
inequality in receiving countries. However, we do not have enough evidence to make any 
claim on the impact of aid on quintile 3 and 4.  
If examining the results from an institutional standpoint, none of the variable 
Institutions is significant, except the negative and slightly significant coefficient in Q4, 
suggesting that income share of Q4 decreases as institutional quality increases (Table 2.4, 
Column 5 under Q4). If quintile 4 is the rich population as we categorized, the result is 
consistent with what we expected, in particular that the rich capture a smaller share of 
income in better institutions. However, we notice that the fourth quintile (Q4) moves 
concurrently with the lower three quintiles (Q1 through Q3), somehow suggesting that 
quintile 4 is not the rich. If so, the negative sign on Institutions in Q4 regression is 
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contradictory to what we would expect. In any case, though, the result is only significant 
at the 10% level. 
Next, we move to the last column (Column 6) where we introduce the interaction 
term, Aid*Institutions, to test hypothesis 2 and 3. The sign and significance of all 
variables remain intact for the most part after adding the interactive terms. Also, if we 
consider only results with significant Aid coefficients (Table 2.4, Column 6 under Q1, Q2, 
Q5, and Gini), the signs on our variable of interest, Aid*Institutions, are all as expected—
positive in regressions on Q1 and Q2 and negative in those on Q5, and Gini coefficient. 
All these signs suggest that if given to countries with better institutions, aid would reduce 
the income share of the lowest two quintiles (Q1 and Q2), increase the income share held 
by the top quintile (Q5), thereby, increasing the gap between the rich and the poor (Gini 
coefficient) by smaller magnitudes. Unfortunately, none of the coefficients are significant, 
indicating that we acquired the sign we expected but do not have enough statistical 
evidence to support our main hypothesis arguing that institutions play a role in aid 
distribution12. These results are in line with a study by Chong et al. (2009) who also find 
that the impact of aid on income inequality is not conditional on corruption level in 
recipient countries. Later in our analysis, we will restrict the sample and check if any 
outliers drive our results.	  
Turning to other control variables in Column 6 under Table 2.4, we see a strong 
support for the Kuznets curve. The coefficients on log of GDP per capita and its squared 
term are highly significant in all cases. The results suggest that in the early stage of 
development, the income shares of the lower four quintiles decrease as GDP increases. 
Until a later stage of development (after reaching a turning point), the income shares of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 We run regressions of the impact of aid and institutions by using each institutional component (i.e. 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law) in three separate regressions. The results are largely 
consistent with those using institutional index constructed by the Principal Component Analysis. We 
present the results in Appendix D. We also estimate regressions using the three institutional variables 
(without constructing an index) in the same regression and examine if they are jointly different from zero. 
We present the results in Appendix E. The results are very similar to the baseline regressions. Specifically, 
aid decreases the income shares of Q1 and Q2, but increases that of Q5, thereby widening income 
inequality. Also, none of the coefficients on institutional variables and the interaction terms is statistically 
significant from zero, except that on bureaucratic quality (Column 1 under Q4 in Appendix E). The p-
values of the joint tests of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law are not significant, except 
those of Q4 and Gini coefficient which are significant at the 5% and 10% level. 
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the four quintiles start to grow as GDP grows. Conversely, the richest population (Q5) 
enjoys a larger income share as the economy grows in the early stage; and, as a 
consequence, the Gini coefficient follows the same inverted U-shape pattern. 
Table 2.4 also indicates that countries whose population acquires more years of 
schooling have significantly higher income share captured by the lower four quintiles. 
Both the magnitude and significance of the effects are generally strong. To be precise, an 
additional year of schooling increases income share of Q1 through Q4 in between 0.16% 
and 0.34%. On the other hand, the effect of percentage of rural population on income 
distribution is less prevalent. The coefficient on rural population is positive and 
significantly different from zero only in regressions on Q3 and Q4, indicating that income 
shares held by Q3 and Q4 tend to be larger for countries with higher percentage of rural 
inhabitants. The results are in contradiction to those found by Bjornskov (2010) and our 
expectation. Despite so, the coefficients are significant at the 5% level and the sizes are 
fairly small. 
On the effects of trade openness, Table 2.4 suggests that only those who are 
already better-off (Q5) take advantage of trade openness, while the rest of the population 
(Q1 through Q4) hurt from the policy. The findings are in line with the general argument 
and some previous studies such as Barro (2000) and Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2010). Yet, 
the magnitudes of the effects are not at all large, so do the strength of the effect. Similarly, 
the lower four quintiles seem to bear the most hardship during high inflation which is 
reflected through negative coefficients on inflation in regressions on Q1 through Q4. The 
statistical significance though is at the 5% level in most cases. 
On survey type, Table 2.4 shows that income inequality varies depending on 
whether the data is based on income or consumption surveys. Positive and highly 
significant coefficients on variable “survey type” from Q1 through Q4 indicate that 
consumption-based surveys display significantly higher income share held by the first 
through fourth quintiles, and a lower income share held by the top quintile. In other 
words, income inequality is significantly smaller when survey data is based on 
consumption rather than on income; the case is mainly attributable to the ability of the 
wealthy in hiding their income and savings in consumption-based surveys (Bjornskov, 
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2010). The finding is consistent with other empirical studies (see, for example,(Bjornskov, 
2010; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2010). 
The estimates above are based on the full sample. In this later analysis, we restrict 
the sample and confirm whether the findings on our variables of interest, Aid and 
Aid*Institutions, hold. This study follows some of Bjornskov (2010) robustness checks, 
which include: (1). using only data from surveys with quality better than 4 in order to 
keep the results clear of dubious observations; (2). keeping only data with the income 
share of top quintile less than 60%; (3). limiting aid volume to normal amount of 1% to 
less than 30% of GDP; and (4). restricting sample to low and lower-middle income 
countries only, where income dynamics can be different than those of the upper-middle 
and high-income countries. Table 2.5 presents results from each sample restrictions in 
Panel A through Panel D respectively. Column 1 under each dependent variable shows 
results of the full models without the interactive term, whereas Column 2 presents those 
with the interaction term, Aid*Institutions. 
Results from our full sample above suggest that aid reduces income share 
captured by the poorest two quintiles to favor that of the top quintile, thereby widening 
inequality gap. In Panel A and Panel B, where we restrict the sample by survey quality 
and income held by the top quintile, the results from our main analysis hold. In addition, 
none of the coefficients on Aid*Institutions is significant, except in regression on Q4 
under Panel A where the coefficient is negative. The result suggests that the effect of aid 
on Q4 in countries with better institutional quality is lower than that in poorer ones. 
However, the coefficient is significant only at the 10% level. Note also that the number of 
observations in these two panels is not much different from that of the full sample, which 
may partly explain why the results do not alter by much. 
Nonetheless, even in Panel C and Panel D, where the sample size reduces by 
almost half from that of the full sample, the results still support the main findings that aid 
has an inequality increasing effect. In addition to the negative effect of aid on the lowest 
two quintiles, we see some evidence of the same effect of aid on income share of quintile 
3. Similarly, the interactive terms, Aid*Institutions, are not significant in all, but in Q4 
under Panel C, suggesting that aid reduces income share of quintile 4 by more if giving to 
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countries with better institutions. The finding is contrary to our hypothesis if Q4 is not the 
rich as discussed above. Like in Panel A though, the coefficient is only slightly 
significant at the 10% level. 
Overall, the results from our main sample hold true in all panels. Specifically, an 
increase in aid as a percentage of GDP reduces income shares of the lowest two quintiles 
(and the third quintile, in some cases), but increases that of the top quintile, thereby 
increasing the gap between the rich and the poor. Similarly, the evidence does not 
indicate any different effect of aid on income distribution given different institutional 
environment, which is contrary to our main hypotheses.  
Next, we move on to examine the effects of tied and untied aid on income 
distribution and explore whether institutions play any role in the effects; Table 2.6 and 
2.7 present the estimates accordingly. As in the preceding table, we present our results 
the same way—Column 1 and 2 show results without and with the interaction term, 
Aid*Institutions, respectively. Here, we use the full sample without any restrictions. As 
Column 1 in Table 2.6 illustrates, an increase in tied aid as a percentage of GDP 
decreases income shares of Q1 through Q3 and favors income distribution toward Q5, 
and again, widening income inequality. The coefficients are highly significant at the 1% 
significance level, except that in Q3. Indeed, the results go against our expectation that 
posits the belief that tied aid is less flexible in the allocation, hence less prone to moral 
hazard, allowing the poor to benefit more from it. 
The main reason why tied aid does not increase income share of the poor as 
expected is probably related to the underlying nature of some aid efforts, which are 
categorized as social programs but not necessarily target the poorer population. In 
particular, even though aid tied to productive sectors, such as infrastructure or education, 
it does not guarantee that the main beneficiaries are the poor. For instance, despite 
marked as education and health aid, higher education or tertiary health would not benefit 
the poor much compared to primary education or basic healthcare. Indeed, Gupta, 
Davoodi, et al. (2002) argue that the well-connected actually lobby government to favor 
these higher education or tertiary health sectors, through which the upper income group 
can enjoy more benefits. Other examples of tied aid that do not benefit the poor include: 
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the building of major water treatment facilities to supply clean water not to areas where 
the most needy and vulnerable live; the construction of hydroelectric dam to supply 
power to the already well-off urban neighborhood; or the building of airport that benefit 
mainly the richer population. 
Furthermore, from an institutional standpoint, none of the coefficients on 
Institutions is significant, but that on Q4, indicating again that income share of Q4 is 
significantly smaller in countries with better institutions, though only at the 10% level. 
Concerning the conditional impact of tied aid on institutions, we expect that tied aid can 
reach the poor more in better institutions. However, in Column 2 where Tied 
aid*Institutions enters the model, we see the same pattern of the effect as in Panel A of 
Table 2.5—institutions is generally not important in tied aid distribution, except for 
quintile 4. 
Table 2.7 indicates untied aid has the same effect as aggregated and tied aid on 
income distribution. Thus, neither tied nor untied aid favors the poor. Interestingly, 
though, if we compare the magnitude of the effects of tied aid (Table 2.6) and untied aid 
(Table 2.7) on income distribution, the coefficients on tied aid are smaller than those on 
untied one. For instance, while a one percent increase in tied aid to GDP reduces income 
share of the poorest quintile by 0.36% (Table 2.6, Column 1 under Q1), an increase of the 
same amount of untied aid to GDP reduces the share of income by up to 0.52% (Table 
2.7, Column 1 under Q1). Therefore, while both aid types have adverse effects on the 
income share of the poor, tied aid seems to carry less negative effects, which is partly 
consistent with our expectation. On the interactive term, similar to previous cases, none 
of the coefficients on Untied aid*Institutions (Table 2.7, Column 2), are significant, 
signifying again that institutions do not have a role to play in aid distribution. 
Taken together, aid does, in fact, reduce income share of the poor, favor the rich, 
and increase inequality in recipient countries as hypothesized. The findings are very 
much consistent with those from previous studies. However, we do not have any 
evidence to support our main hypothesis arguing that the poor benefit more from aid in 
countries with better institutions. The same conclusion applies to both tied and untied aid. 
Several reasons could be attributed to the findings in our study, those include: 
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First, the richer population might have greater advantage than the poorer one in 
reaping the benefits generated by aid. Particularly, in developing countries where the 
richer population is usually more equipped with better education, network, and other 
resources, chances are the group is more likely to have the opportunity to participate and 
enjoy aid inflow. The case can be even more pronounced when a large sum of aid 
resources are not directly provided from donors to the poor, but to the national system. 
Second, as briefly mentioned in Section 2.2.3, according to the aid allocation 
literature, donors are not purely altruistic, but self-centered and practice their aid giving 
under different agendas and motivations (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Clist, 2011; Harrigan 
& Wang, 2011). Indeed, many argue that donors are more likely to focus their aid giving 
on strategic or political interests. Accordingly, they use aid as a tool to buy support from 
the political elites who hold the voting power (for literature on aid as a vote buying tool, 
see(Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2008b; Dreher & Sturm, 2012; Fink & Redaelli, 
2011). Additionally, this study cannot detect any discernible negative effect of poor 
institutions in aid distribution possibly due to another aid-giving motive that partially 
redirects aid resources back to donor countries. Specifically, donors with commercial 
interest can either tie aid back to their account through requirement of procurement of 
goods and services or favor only projects with high commercial benefits. In such cases, 
aid is less likely to be designed for the poor, explaining why recipient’s institutions play 
no role in the distribution of aid. 
Third, as Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) and McGillivray et al. (2011) contend, 
aid agencies sometimes have the incentive to bypass the poor. As the agents to taxpayers 
in donor countries, aid agencies are under pressure to prove success, mostly short-term. 
They thus have more incentive to allocate their aid money to projects with higher chances 
of immediate success. Accordingly, they choose a location of their activities in less 
difficult environments, which generally are not the areas with the most needy population. 
In that respect, regardless of how good recipient institutions are, aid cannot benefit the 
poor more. 
Fourth, the channels of aid delivery can pose as another possible reason why we 
cannot detect the role of institutions in the aid distribution. Before aid gets to the final 
57	  
	  
beneficiary in the form of goods and services, aid resources go through a chain of 
delivery systems starting from taxpayers in donor countries, to bilateral aid agencies, to 
intergovernmental organizations, to recipient governments or international NGOs, and to 
local NGOs. This chain does not count for private-sector firms carrying out aid contracts 
(Werker & Ahmed, 2008). The multiple layers of the chain causing remarkable 
fragmentations, hence high overhead costs, coupled with the proclaimed ineffective aid 
modalities such as technical assistance (Easterly & Pfutze, 2008), suggest that only a 
certain amount of aid money is actually reaching the intended beneficiaries. Just like 
what Werker and Ahmed (2008) state “How many dollars from the initial transfer 
actually reach the final beneficiary is anybody’s guess” (p. 88). 
Last but not least, we cannot detect the impact of institutions in aid distribution 
possibly because the study is plagued by much noise at a macro level. As illustrated in 
Section 2.2.2, mounting evidence from case studies and project level exploratory survey 
work  have shown that corruption, quality of bureaucracy, and the rule of law indeed 
have the power to change the course of aid distribution. Failing to find any significant 
role of institutions at this macro level may render directions for future studies toward a 
more micro one. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This essay studies the impact of aid on income distribution with the central focus 
on the role of institutions. Employing data for 85 countries from 1960 to 2004, our results 
suggest that aid has a negative effect on income shares captured by the lowest two 
quintiles, but positive one on that of the rich, which ultimately widens inequality gap. To 
this extent, the results are very much consistent with previous studies of the impact of aid 
on income distribution. Note, however, that the results do not suggest in any way that aid 
makes the poor poorer; all the study finds is aid leads to relatively smaller income share 
of the poor, or the poor benefit the least from aid. Also, the same findings can be applied 
to both tied and untied aid. While exploring the effect of aid on income distribution, we 
58	  
	  
also argued that good institutions would divert more aid money towards the poor. 
Unfortunately, we do not find any evidence to prove that this is the case. 
Beside the ability of the rich to capture more benefit from aid, we attribute our 
findings to several other causes, one of which is the donor’s motivation in giving aid. 
When donors are not altruistic and use aid mainly for political purposes or self-interest, 
aid is initially not designed with the poor in mind, making them the least beneficiary 
under any circumstances; be it in good institutions or not. Both donors and recipient 
governments should be concerned about the findings (i.e., aid decreases the income 
shares of the poor and increases inequality), especially given the whole premises, or at 
least the hope, that aid giving is for poverty reduction. Even if aid can increase the overall 
living standards in recipient countries, the increasingly wider gap between the rich and 
the poor can bring about social unjust that can sometimes leads to social unease.  
The results thus call for increase accountability on both the donor and recipient 
sides, specifically with respect to aid delivery, design, and better targeting. One way of 
overcoming the issue of aid delivery is for donors to allocate more funds to agencies that 
work closely with those who often understand the poor’s needs and constraints the most. 
The results also suggest that the wide perception that aid serves the poor more in good 
institutions may not be as compelling as was thought. This study does not suggest in any 
way that institutions are irrelevant, hence should be ignored. While donor’s motivation 
seems to play a larger role here, the effect of institutions may possibly not be detectable 
at a macro level. If we explore how institutions affect the distribution of aid at 
project/local level, we might be able to see a clearer picture of the importance of 
institutions in aid distribution.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID AND INSTITUTIONS 
ON HUMAN WELFARE 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since its inception in 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have 
become a widely accepted yard stick to measure development progress across the globe. 
Achieve universal primary education, improve maternal health, reduce child mortality, 
combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases are among the eight goals of the MDGs to be 
reached by the year 2015. A list of selected indicators has also been put in place to 
monitor the progress of each goal. The latest report on the MDGs shows that significant 
and substantial progress has been made in reaching some targets. Generally, the success 
of the progresses is by and large inconsistent: some indicators are enjoying positive and 
promising results, while others are still lagging behind. Disparities between rural and 
urban gaps, between countries, and even regions are another concern. Among all targets, 
health seems to be an area highlighted by some successes, such as a decline in new HIV 
infection, a drop in under-five and maternal mortality rates by 41percent and 47 percent 
over the past twenty years (respectively), and remarkable accomplishments are occurring 
in the global fight against malaria and tuberculosis (United Nations, 2013). Some 
improvements in education are also noticeable even though they seem to be occurring at a 
slower pace than the health sector. The story, however, tells us little about whether 
development assistance is attributable to these positive changes. 
Undoubtedly, the international donor community has committed and increasingly 
provided more aid to developing countries to reach the MDGs by the soon approaching 
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deadline; until only recently this upward trend has been interrupted by tight national 
budget on the donor’s side. The increase in the provision of aid, coupled with an on-
going effort to enhance the effectiveness of development assistance, has motivated much 
empirical research to explore whether aid has been successful. The focus of the literature 
has long been on the impact of aid on economic growth. Only recently has the shift 
occurred from examining the growth impact of aid to exploring its impact on human 
development. Certainly, aid can benefit recipient countries in many ways other than 
through its impact on monetary outcomes, such as health, education, sanitation—simply 
put quality of life or human welfare—all of which are integrated within the MDGs and 
are arguably more important than monetary outcomes. Additionally, the quest to examine 
the effect of aid on welfare outcomes is even more important when health and education 
are noticeably the two sectors that have enjoyed constant and generous aid.  
At the same time, aid literature has also increasingly recognized the importance of 
institutions in aid effectiveness mainly because institutions provide not only a conducive 
environment in which things can operate effectively, but institutions can also have the 
potential to determine the use of public resources. Since aid is a form of public resources 
funneled through the recipient government, the government’s institutions can clearly play 
a crucial role in the process of converting the resources into goods and services, some of 
which are health and education. The importance of these institutions is even more 
substantial when billions of aid dollars are transferred directly to the government for 
distribution annually (Moyo, 2009). Institutions encompass different dimensions, among 
which corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law are the focus of 
this study. The three components feed each other and constitute an environment that can 
either facilitate or impede the very effort of aid to improve human welfare. 
Corruption can siphon off aid money or redirect the resources from productive 
expenses that work to improve quality of life (e.g., health and education), to 
nonproductive ones (e.g., military). Corruption is arguably an important aspect of the 
recipient government’s abilities to allocate and manage aid resources effectively. 
Similarly, bureaucratic quality, which signifies the quality of service provision and 
competency of civil servants, is another indicator of aid success or failure at the 
implementation stage, particularly because recipient governments are often the main 
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projects/programs implementers. Health and education outcomes are directly related to 
the quality of health professions and teachers, but in many developing countries these two 
professionals are often under-qualified and underpaid. Shirking, absenteeism, lack of 
training, and limited professional ability among public officials are not uncommon in 
countries where bureaucratic system has a low accountability. Each of these can lead to 
ineffective service provisions and losing of public confidence in the system, undermining 
aid intervention in enhancing recipient welfare. 
Weak rule of law is a major cause leading to rampant corruption and public 
accountability failing in many developing countries. Allegedly, the rule of law provides 
institutional checks on government and is supposively effective in monitoring the 
corruption and punishment of dishonest officials. When such a supervisory body is 
fragile, however, the authority can use aid resources inefficiently by redirecting funds 
towards its unintended use, or diverting it for personal gain without the fear of being 
caught or even prosecuted when caught. In that sense, a strong rule of law is greatly 
needed to provide proper monitoring and accountability. In this study, we argue that aid 
is more effective in improving recipient’s welfare if given to countries with better 
institutional quality.  
The relationship between foreign aid and human welfare also depends on the 
mechanisms through which aid is absorbed (Chatterjee & Turnovsky, 2007). 
Development aid flows into recipient countries in different shapes and forms, so its 
transmission channels affects welfare. Generally, aid is thought to supplement domestic 
resources in boosting investments, thereby enhancing growth (Asiama & Quartey, 2009). 
If aid affects growth and growth in turn affects human welfare, we can postulate that aid 
has an indirect effect on welfare through growth. Additionally, aid can affect welfare by 
influencing the composition of public expenditure that mainly contributes to improving 
social sectors. The expenditure is usually known as pro-poor public expenditure (PPE). 
Finally, aid affects welfare directly through the work of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) whose efforts involve improvements in health, education, and 
sanitation at the local levels. To further extend our understanding of how aid works, this 
study also takes into account its transmission channels, mainly the direct and the PPE 
channels. 
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Research Questions 
In this study, we therefore ask two important questions:  
1. Does aid increase human welfare in recipient countries? 
2. What is the impact of institutions on the effectiveness of aid on human welfare? 
Specifically, does the effect of aid on welfare conditions on recipient countries’ 
institutions? 
 
Possible Contributions 
The potential contributions of this research to aid effectiveness literature are three 
fold: 
First, the literature of aid effectiveness has been overwhelmingly taken up by the 
impact of aid on economic growth. Only recently have aid scholars turned their focus to 
studying the effect of aid on other outcomes. Among those outcomes, human 
development is receiving growing attention. In that respect, this study adds to the 
relatively underexplored, yet growing, literature on the impact of aid on human welfare. 
Second, as an extension of existing aid and welfare literature, this study explores 
the importance of institutions on improving aid effectiveness. Most aid effectiveness 
studies are not concerned with recipient countries’ institutional quality, and they do not 
seem to take into consideration the importance of institutions in shaping and determining 
how aid can possibly work best. Even when researchers consider institutions as 
conditional aid effectiveness, they only examine a narrower aspect of institutions 
separately, that is, democracy or corruption. In particular, in conducting a literature 
review, we have not been able to locate any study that conditions welfare effectiveness of 
aid on various aspects of institutions (i.e., corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, 
and the rule of law) as we do in this study. 
Third, while most studies focus on two indicators of welfare (i.e. Human 
Development Index (HDI) and infant mortality rate), this study disaggregates HDI to 
include its subcomponents of health and education indicators. The advantage of 
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disaggregating HDI allows us to examine not only the effectiveness of aid at aggregate 
level, but also to elucidate the specific improvements at sectoral level, which can be 
varied under different institutional settings. In addition, the research also studies the 
effect of aid by source, i.e. bilateral and multilateral aid, broadening its contribution to 
the literature. 
 
Structure of the Essay 
The rest of the research is organized as follows: Section 3.2, presents relevant 
literature which includes studies of the impact of aid on human welfare and the impact of 
institutions on welfare upon which we build our hypotheses. While reviewing the 
literature, the section also takes into account the channels through which aid affects 
human welfare. Section 3.3 introduces the model, methodology, and describes the data. 
Section 3.4 discusses estimation results, which is followed by the conclusion in Section 
3.5. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Much of the literature on aid effectiveness focuses on its macroeconomic impact, 
such as its impact on economic growth, savings, and investment. In particular, the 
literature places heavy emphasis on growth. The earlier studies on the effectiveness of aid 
on growth yielded inconclusive results. Some find aid stimulates growth, while others 
find the contrary. Given the inconclusive nature of these earlier studies, much of the later 
research has focused on the conditions that might be crucial to aid effectiveness. Burnside 
and Dollar’s (2000) influential, yet controversial study concludes that aid accelerates 
growth in countries where good policies are in place, but on average, aid has little impact 
on growth. Even though the results have created much debate among researchers in the 
field, the aid literature increasingly focuses on the conditions, if any, under which aid 
works. This emerging research suggests a non-linear relationship between aid and growth. 
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Kosack (2003) extends conditional aid and growth research as he focuses on aid’s 
effect on the quality of life or human welfare. He adopts the cross-country growth 
regression approach by replacing the growth impact of aid with the welfare impact of aid 
and uses democracy as an institutional condition to aid effectiveness. Using Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) on a group of 48 countries from 1974 to 1985, the study finds that 
aid combined with democracy improves quality of life, proxied in the study by the 
Human Development Index (HDI). Since then, the aid literature seems to ignore the 
welfare effect of aid conditional on institutions. 
In a recent study, Dietrich (2011) explores a similar effect, but focuses on the 
conditioning effect of corruption on aid effectiveness in health sector. Instead of 
grounding his argument on the role of institutions, though, Dietrich (2011) utilizes a 
strategic compliance basis arguing that corrupt leaders actually have incentives to use aid 
effectively in some sectors. He maintains that corrupt recipient governments are more 
likely to comply with donor objectives in sectors that incur the cheapest compliance costs 
(for example, the health sector). Specifically, health aid is often implemented alongside 
other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and multinational agencies, making it 
less susceptible to corruption as compared to other sectors like transportation, energy, and 
mining, where corruption can be lucrative. Cheaper compliance costs in health aid thus 
lend itself for corrupt leaders to forgo this sector to meet with donors’ objectives, thus 
maintaining aid inflow. Studying the effect of health aid on immunization rates in 64 
developing and transitioning countries from 1994-2004, Dietrich (2011) finds that aid is 
more effective in increasing immunization coverage in countries with poorer institutions. 
The result is highly robust to many specifications. Other than Kosack (2003) and Dietrich 
(2011), the literature on conditional aid and welfare is lightly addressed. 
In the area of literature about aid effectiveness on human welfare, most scholars 
focus on monetary welfare indicators. Those indicators include the headcount index, the 
percentage of population living under $1 or $2 a day, and the percentage of people living 
below the national poverty line (see, for example, Alvi & Senbeta, 2011; Chong, 
Gradstein, & Calderon, 2009;(Garces-Ozanne, 2011). However, some argue that these 
monetary welfare indicators cannot measure the true quality of life that people have. For 
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instance, Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) ask whether those who 
earn more than $1 a day but have no access to any social service facilities are better off 
than those who earn less than $1 a day but have sufficient access to the provision of basic 
healthcare, education, and other social services. Their argument is extreme because those 
living at the subsistence levels also have very low access to basic social services. Yet, it 
is still justifiable that non-monetary welfare is of higher value and preferable than the 
monetary ones. Thus, investigating the impact of aid on non-monetary welfare in 
recipient counties can be even more worthwhile, particularly when non-monetary welfare 
is another measurable outcome of aid. Of the already limited literature on how welfare 
effect aid, we only find a small number of studies that focus on the non-monetary welfare 
indicators such as the Human Development Index, life expectancy, infant mortality rate, 
child mortality rate, and primary enrollment/completion rate. 
Interestingly, the literature also brings to the discussion how aid affects welfare. 
Many scholars, such as Alvi and Senbeta (2012), Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004), 
and Mosley and Suleiman (2007), to name a few, criticize the idea that growth is the only 
channel through which aid affects poverty/welfare. In particular, since a majority of aid 
provided can have a more direct impact on welfare than through growth, evaluating the 
effectiveness of aid based only on the growth may underestimate the actual effectiveness. 
Accordingly, one of the first to tackle the issue, Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and 
Verschoor (2003) take into account other aid channels in their empirical work. One of the 
channels is aid’s direct impact such as donor-funded projects to Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), whose work involves health, sufficient sanitation, and education. 
Another channel, arguably a more important one, is through financing government 
expenditure. A large part of foreign aid is used to finance government expenditure. If the 
expenditure affects welfare, aid then influences welfare outcomes through its effect on 
the composition of public expenditure. 
Needless to say, not all types of government expenditure go toward improving 
human welfare. The literature has identified “pro-poor public expenditure” (PPE), or 
social sector spending by some (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, et al., 2005; Mosley et al., 
2004; Pettersson, 2007b), to be important in increasing the welfare of the poor because 
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they can potentially get access to healthcare and basic education through these kinds of 
spending. Using Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) and Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation techniques for a sample of 34 countries from 1980 to 2000, Mosley et 
al. (2004) find that aid improves welfare, proxied in their study by poverty headcount and 
infant mortality rate, through its effect on pro-poor public expenditure. 
Even though Asiama and Quartey (2009) do not explicitly specify the channel 
through which aid affects welfare, the types of aid examined in the study imply the direct 
and indirect channel of the impact. Asiama and Quartey (2009) explore the effectiveness 
of bilateral, sectoral, and program aid on increasing HDI and infant mortality in 49 Sub-
Saharan African countries. Sectoral or project aid affect welfare directly, whereas 
program aid complements public expenditure affects welfare through social spending. 
They find that aggregate aid does not have any significant impact on human development 
indicators, but when disaggregating aid into project/sectoral aid and program aid, these 
specific aid types have positive and significant impacts on HDI, but not infant mortality 
rate. They thus suggest that aid should be targeted for the specific sectors that have 
proven to be the most effective. Indeed, when studying the effectiveness of aid in poverty 
reduction using a sample of 39 developing and transitional economics from 1980 to 2002, 
Mosley and Suleiman (2007) find aid allocated for agriculture, infrastructure, and 
education is more effective in reducing poverty headcount and infant mortality rate. 
In a similar vein, Verschoor and Kalwij (2006) also present the positive effects of 
aid. Specifically, they find that aid not only tends to increase the share of government 
expenditure on social sectors in recipient countries, but it also increases the 
responsiveness of infant mortality rate to economic growth. That is, economic growth in 
countries receiving a higher amount of aid tends to reduce infant mortality at a faster rate 
than the growth in countries receiving less aid. Even though the impact of aid on the 
responsiveness of infant mortality to growth is not the impact of aid on infant mortality 
rate per se, the results signify a positive effect of aid. The result in Verschoor and 
Kalwij’s (2006) study does not come without any drawbacks, though. Since part of aid 
complements public sector spending, there appears to be a potential double counting of 
aid amount in their social service expenditure. In order to avoid this drawback, our study 
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adopts the method employed by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, et al. (2005), which takes 
out the aid component from public sector spending. 
To remove the aid component from pro-poor public expenditure (PPE), Gomanee, 
Morrissey, Mosley, et al. (2005) calculate the residual of PPE, which is a function of 
foreign aid. By using a PPE residual, the study finds that aid actually does not affect 
welfare through PPE because regardless of whether they include PPE in their models, aid 
significantly works to improve human welfare by increasing HDI and lowering infant 
mortality rate. On the contrary, in their unpublished article, Gomanee et al. (2003) find a 
different result—aid works only through PPE to improve welfare. What is notable about 
the main difference between these two studies is the size of their samples (38 countries 
from 1980-1998 in the working paper version as opposed to 104 countries from 1980-
2000 in the published one). Thus, as also noted in Pettersson (2007a, 2007b), the results 
appear to be sensitive to the sample chosen. Notwithstanding the contradiction in their 
two studies, both results suggest that aid improves recipients’ quality of life.  
With respect to the effect by country groups, Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, et al. 
(2005) find that aid is more effective in low-income countries than in middle-income 
countries. This finding is in line with that found in their extended research Gomanee, 
Morrissey, and Girma (2005). Specifically, using the same countries’ sample and time 
frame but employing quantile regression for the estimations, this later study also finds aid 
to be more effective in improving HDI and reducing infant mortality in countries with 
lower levels of human development. 
Employing the same method of stripping out aid from PPE to study aid fungibility, 
another field of aid literature, Pettersson (2007b) finds that aid contributes to reducing 
infant mortality through PPE, though the result is not robust to small changes in model 
specifications. In another study, though, Pettersson (2007a) does not take out the aid 
component from PPE, and he finds aid reduces child mortality only in democracies. 
Contrary to most work above, Boone (1996) finds no evidence that aid affects 
infant mortality rate, primary schooling ratio, or life expectancy. However, Gomanee, 
Morrissey, and Girma (2005) criticize Boone’s (1996) findings on the grounds that the 
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study is based on “inappropriately specified regressions” because aid might not have any 
direct impact on welfare but through the mechanism of public expenditure (p. 300). 
Similar to Boone (1996) though, Williamson (2008) findings support the ineffectiveness 
of foreign sectoral aid on human development. One of the first to examine health aid on 
its corresponding health outcomes, Williamson (2008) finds that health aid does not 
exhibit positive results on infant mortality rate, life expectancy, death rate, and 
immunizations (DPT and measles). Her findings are robust to various sensitivity checks. 
Wilson (2011) joins the faction who claims that aid is ineffective. Using different 
estimation techniques (i.e. the dynamic panel model, GMM, and the latent growth model) 
on a sample of 96 high mortality rate countries from 1975-2005, Wilson (2011) finds that 
health aid does not reduce infant mortality rate. In fact, most of health aid coefficients in 
his study are not only insignificant, but also positive, which is not the correct sign. He 
contends that possibly the “too small” level of health aid is the reason why it is so 
difficult to see any notable effects in aggregate measures (p. 2040). Yet, the study finds 
some optimistic results, but in a small magnitude, of the effectiveness of sub-sector 
health aid such as those for family planning and for fighting against HIV/AIDS. Of the 
few studies examining health aid, only Mishra and Newhouse (2009) reach a positive 
conclusion that more health aid results in lower infant mortality rate. The magnitude of 
the effect though is very small, e.g. doubling health aid per capita from $1.60 to $3.20 
leads to a reduction of roughly 1.5 infant deaths per 1,000 live births. With that small 
impact, Mishra and Newhouse (2009) emphasize that it would require an increase of 15 
folds of the current health aid amount in order to reach the MDGs targets by the soon 
approaching deadline. 
With respect to education aid, Christensen, Homer, and Nielson (2011), who 
disaggregate aid by type, do not find the effectiveness of aggregate primary aid for 
primary education, but do find that bilateral primary aid is highly and statistically 
significant in improving primary school enrollment rate in receiving countries. Similarly, 
studying the effectiveness of aid at sectoral level, Michaelowa and Weber (2007), also 
find that education aid is effective in increasing primary education, as measured by net 
enrollment rate and primary completion rate. However, the magnitude of the impact is 
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minimal; for example, an increase in education aid of 200% increases completion rate by 
merely 2.5 percentage points. The results of which is also shared by Dreher, 
Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2008a) who find a positive, though small, relationship between 
education aid and primary school enrollment. Despite small effect, insofar as aid 
improves education outcomes, it may in fact contribute to bettering human development 
overtime. 
With a few exceptions of the studies that find the ineffectiveness of aid, especially 
at the sectoral level, the empirical literature has provided a somewhat coherent finding 
that aid is effective in advancing the quality of life in recipient countries. Drawing from 
the literature, thus we can construct our hypothesis as below:  
Hypothesis 1: An increase in aid increases human welfare. 
 
 Even though the aforementioned literature draws a conclusion that aid is effective 
in increasing HDI, reducing infant mortality rate, bringing more children to school or 
keeping them in school, generally the magnitude of the end product is minimal, 
especially when taking into consideration the billions of dollars allocated every year to 
recipient countries’ accounts. That aid has too few results is attributed to many setbacks 
in recipient countries, in particular its poor institutional quality. Despite the aid literature 
repeatedly arguing for, only a dearth of empirical studies actually examine the interplay 
between aid and institutions on welfare outcomes. Beside the abovementioned two 
studies, Kosack (2003) and Dietrich (2011), who use democracy and corruption as 
institutional aspects, respectively, little is known of the connection between aid, 
institutions, and human welfare. Building on Dietrich (2011) in particular, we focus on a 
broader concept of institutions, i.e. corruption, the rule of law, and quality of bureaucracy. 
In the rest of this section, we will discuss how institutions play a role in linking aid and 
human welfare upon which we construct our main hypothesis. 
Two main components constituting human development indicator (health and 
education) are regularly receiving a large sum of development aid compared to other 
sectors. However, the aid effort is unlikely to reach its full potential of advancing the 
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quality of life when channeling to a system often characterized by corruption, low quality 
of bureaucracy, and weak rule of law. The importance of recipient institutions is even 
more pronounced when billions of aid resources are transferred directly to the system 
(Moyo, 2009). Indeed, there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence of how aid funds is 
being misused or captured. For example, in a corruption scandal in one low-income 
country, a local newspaper accused the government of misappropriating US$50 million 
of aid funds in health sector; the health ministry then accused the newspaper of 
overstating the incidence by defending that the funds was not misappropriated in one year, 
but over a period of three years (Filmer, Hammer, & Pritchett,(2000). 
Clearly, rampant corruption is especially the main concern in many developing 
countries. As Mosley et al. (2004) contends, corruption leads to leakages of aid funds at 
different stages before reaching the intended targets. The most prevailing act of 
corruption is direct stealing of aid resources such as the selling of medicines funded by 
aid money in black market (Easterly, 2006), the siphoning off non-wage education funds 
in Uganda leaving just roughly 30% of the expenditures to local facilities during 1991-95 
(Ablo & Reinikka, 1999), or the missing of roughly 80% of school entitlements from the 
Ugandan central government in 2001 (Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). Because part of 
foreign aid is financing health and education through recipient governments, any misuse 
or private capture of the resources at the implementation stage can surely lower the 
impact of aid on improving the health and education conditions in recipient countries. 
Conversely, any endeavors to control corruption can lead to better health and education 
results.  
The aid studies that explore the effectiveness of aid in the health and education 
sectors also find that curbing corruption can lead to higher welfare results. For instance, 
Mosley et al. (2004) find that corruption control significantly reduces infant mortality 
rate and increases pro-poor public expenditure (PPE—the expenditure category believed 
to have the utmost potential to improving human welfare discussed earlier in the section). 
The same result is shared by Dietrich (2011), who finds a positive effect of corruption 
control on increasing the immunization rate. Likewise, in the education sector, 
Christensen et al. (2011) find the same encouraging result of corruption control on 
71	  
	  
primary school enrollment in a sample of 63 aid receiving countries. The results in the 
above studies are mostly highly significant at the 1% level. 
Even though the empirical literature that exclusively examines the causal 
relationships between corruption and welfare outcomes is relatively scarce, the findings 
from the literature cannot stress enough that corruption has dire consequences for social 
service provisions. Of the few studies implemented in this field, Gupta, Davoodi, and 
Tiongson (2000) explore the impact of corruption on various indicators of both health 
and education outcomes. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimation techniques on data covers 128 countries for the period from 
1985 to 1997, Gupta et al. (2000) find that an increase in corruption leads to higher rates 
in primary school dropout, higher percent of low-birthweight babies to total births, and 
more child and infant mortality. The results are largely statistically significant at least at 
the 5% level. 
Similarly, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999), who study the 
relationship between governance and development outcomes find similar relationships 
between governance and welfare. Using 2SLS to control for reverse causality on a cross-
sectional data for about 150 countries, Kaufmann et al. (1999) find that good governance 
leads to an increase in welfare by reducing infant mortality and raising adult literacy rates. 
In particular, an increase in one-standard deviation in governance leads to an increase 
between 15 to 25 percentage points in the literacy rate; the results are also favorable for 
infant mortality. Their governance index includes six indicators, two of which are 
government effectiveness (or quality of bureaucracy) and the rule of law. Furthermore, 
the evidence on the link between corruption and welfare outcomes also derives from 
studies within countries. Studying the effect of corruption in health sector in the 
Philippines using data from 80 local municipalities, Azfar and Gurgur (2008) find many 
adverse consequences of corruption, in particular corruption increases waiting time at 
public health clinics, lowers public satisfaction over public health services, discourages 
the use of the services, and finally it delays newborn vaccination and  reduces 
immunization rate. 
Besides affecting human welfare directly, corruption also affects other functions 
that work to support the aid efforts. For instance, aid for improved sanitation 
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implemented by NGOs would be slow or only partially successful if corrupt officials 
divert government resources away from relevant budget line deemed important for public 
sanitation (e.g., budget line for national campaign on sanitation awareness). Indeed, 
existing literature actually illuminates the role of corruption in the composition of public 
expenditure, in particular pro-poor public expenditure that supports welfare improvement. 
Among the studies, Mauro (1998) finds that an increase in corruption is associated with a 
reduction in government expenditure on education; he also finds similar bias against 
spending in the health sector. Because the majority of the population in developing 
countries relies mainly on government-provided education and health services, the 
reduction of government spending in these sectors may impede improvement in overall 
welfare. 
However, even when the allocation on the health and education sectors is 
sufficient, the efficacy of the spending is another issue. As in the case of Uganda, the 
allotted education funds from the central government would not entirely reach its local 
facilities in the presence of corruption. Such misuse, mismanagement, and leakage of 
funds might explain why a large number of empirical studies find little, if any at all, 
evidence of significant effect of public spending on outcomes. In an earlier study, for 
example, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) explore the impact of health expenditure on its 
corresponding outcomes using cross-national data from 100 (both developing and 
developed) countries in 1990. They find that the share of health spending as a percentage 
of GDP is not a significant determinant of infant and under-5 mortality rates once 
different socioeconomic variables, such as GDP per capita, female education, income 
inequality, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, are controlled for. The coefficients on 
health spending are numerically small, if not at all significant, at conventional level. 
Specifically, health expenditure explain less than one percent of the variance in both 
infant and under-5 mortality rates. 
These results are also shared by McGuire (2006) who uses two cross-sectional 
datasets—46 countries in 1995/1996 and 94 countries in 1999—to study the relationship 
between spending and outcomes in the same health sector. McGuire (2006) finds no 
association between any healthcare spending indicators used in the study and under-5 
mortality rate in both of his samples. Interestingly though, under-5 mortality rate is 
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strongly associated with programs targeting to reducing it, particularly to maternal and 
infant healthcare services. Other studies also support the weak contribution of public 
spending to welfare outcomes (see for example, Filmer et al., 2000;(Gupta et al., 2000; 
Kim & Moody, 1992). 
Of the many studies, only a few find that public spending matters. For instance, 
using OLS and 2SLS estimation techniques on a data for 50 developing and transition 
countries, Gupta, Verhoeven, and Tiongson (2002) find that an increase in education 
spending leads to higher education outcomes including higher primary and secondary 
enrollment rates and lower primary dropout rate, at the same time an increase in health 
spending is also associated with lower infant and child mortality rates. The results are 
robust to different specifications; however, the statistical significance is relatively weak 
at the 5% level at best. 
The finding from Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), who examine the interplay 
between institutions and spending on welfare, can undeniably provide some insights into 
explaining why the impact of health and education spending on outcomes is small if not 
at all significant. Using data for 91 countries over three years, 1990, 1997, and 2003, 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) find that health and primary education expenditures at the 
margin are less effective in reducing under-5 mortality and primary education failure 
rates, respectively, in countries with poor institutions measured by corruption and 
bureaucratic quality. Since most aid recipient countries are characterized with poor 
institutions, that is, very corrupt with a low quality of bureaucracy, the results from 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) can clearly depict how poor institutional quality limits the 
impact of health and education aid on its corresponding welfare outcomes.  
Arguably, rampant corruption is a norm in many developing countries because 
weak rule of law allows corrupt officials to get away from being held accountable for 
their actions or even lets loose of the officials when get caught. Additionally, lack of 
proper institutional checks provides the government with the incentive to renege on their 
commitments (Haggard & Tiede, 2011), including those related to resource allocation. 
The aid literature focusing on fungibility suggests that recipient governments do in fact 
divert part of their own resource from sectors financed by aid to fund other sectors that 
donors do not intend for, which sometimes even work against the improvement of 
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welfare; for instance, a redirection from education to military spending (Feyzioglu et al., 
1998; Khilji & Zampelli, 1994; Pettersson, 2007b). Some studies such as Devarajan, 
Rajkumar, and Swaroop (1999) and Chatterjee, Giuliano, and Ilker (2007) find only a 
portion of aid stays in the sectors it was initially financed for; thereby, providing an 
indication of how aid may be ineffective for countries with weak rule of law, low 
accountability, and transparency. 
Along the same line, institutional capacity is vital to any provision of services. 
Because recipient governments are the aid implementing agencies, the capacity is 
especially relevant at the implementation stage. Even in cases when the governments are 
not the main projects/program implementers, they still work in close collaboration with 
other NGOs or donor agencies carrying out the projects. Clearly, health and education 
outcomes are directly linked to the service providers. In many developing countries, 
doctors, teachers, nurses, are often under-qualified and underpaid, which in many ways 
affect how aid is implemented. For example, in the case of HIV/AIDS intervention, lack 
of proper training of local healthcare providers to handle the somewhat complicated 
drugs, the intervention not only saved fewer lives than it promised, but it also lead to 
serious issue of drug resistance (Easterly, 2006). Similarly, the impact of health aid in the 
form of other medicines or vaccinations would not go very far if the providers lack 
incentive to clearly instruct and follow-up on patients. Also, poor government 
bureaucracy only works against the very effort of aid in providing basic care and bringing 
more children to school when healthcare providers receive bribes from patients or 
teachers collect illicit fees from students. 
Finally, shirking, absenteeism, and lack of motivation among public officials 
often undermine the quality, accessibility, and utilization of basic public services in many 
aid receiving countries. The absenteeism among public service providers in some 
countries can be alarmingly high. Based on surveys done in six developing countries 
between 2001-2002, Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers (2006) 
report that the average absenteeism rate for teachers is 19% and that for health workers, 
both doctors and nurses, is 35%. The authors further note that the number is more 
generous than the real picture considering that it does not take into account the number of 
providers who were not working even when showing up. On top of that, when the quality 
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of public health workers competency is limited and performance is low, arguably as a 
result of low salary, the care providing in itself would not be effective (Filmer et al., 
2000;(Dupas, 2011). All these factors lead the public to lose confidence in the system 
altogether. Thus, any aid efforts mediated through such system may not have much 
impact on welfare outcomes. 
The discussion above suggests that the impact of aid on welfare is contingent 
upon recipient countries’ institutions; therefore, we build our second hypothesis as below: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of aid on welfare is larger for countries with better 
quality of institutions. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
As a recap from previous section, the study tests the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: An increase in aid increases human welfare. 
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of aid on welfare is larger for countries with better 
quality of institutions. 
In order to test the above hypotheses, this study utilizes the traditional model of 
conditional aid and growth literature which is also adopted in aid and welfare studies 
such as Kosack (2003) and Dietrich (2011). As in many aid effectiveness studies, 
endogenous causation between aid amount a country receives and its development status 
is a widely problematic issue often discussed. Intuitively, donors can respond to low 
human welfare in the developing world by providing more aid. At the same time, they 
can also award countries with positive trend or good performance (i.e. high level of 
human welfare) with more aid. To put it another way, there is a possibility that the level 
of human welfare determines the amount of aid received by recipient countries. The aid 
literature though provides no clear theory as to what direction this relationship might take. 
One common approach to correct for endogeneity is to utilize instrumental variables. 
This study therefore employs Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) as the estimation method 
to account for potential endogeneity between aid and welfare indicators. 
76	  
	  
Modified from Dietrich (2011) and following previous research, the interplay 
between aid and institutions is captured by their interactions in the model, which takes 
the form of:   𝑊!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" + 𝛽!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!"                         +𝛾!!" + 𝜀!!"              (1) 𝐴𝑖𝑑!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑍!" + 𝛼!𝑋!" + 𝜀!!"       (2) 𝐴𝑖𝑑!" ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" = 𝛺! + 𝛺!𝑍!" + 𝛺!𝑋!" + 𝜀!!"     (3) 
 
From (1), the aggregate welfare (W) is a function of aid as a percentage of GDP 
(Aid), the quality of institutions (Institutions), the interaction between aid and institutions 
(Aid*Institutions), and other control variables that also have the impact on welfare 
(Controls). Our model is very parsimonious where control variables include initial human 
welfare level, GDP per capita, and total population. 𝛾  is time period dummy to control for 
fixed-time effects and 𝜀 is the error term. From (2) and (3), Z is a vector of excluded 
instruments and X is a vector of included instruments. The subscript i and t denote 
country and time period, respectively. Except for Institutions, all variables are in 
logarithmic forms; thus the coefficients have to be interpreted as the percentage change in 
dependent variables given the percentage change in independent variables. In essence, 
they represent elasticities. 
Regarding instrumental variables for aid, the aid effectiveness literature uses a 
different set of instruments. The popular ones are those proposed by Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). We use three regional dummies as found in most research to capture donors’ 
strategic interests and special treatment as instruments for aid. The three regional 
dummies include Egypt, a US ally and a major US aid recipient, Franc zone, a major EU 
aid recipient, and Central America, which is also a region under the sphere of the US 
influence. To assess our instruments, we report F-statistics for the excluded instruments 
in the first stage and the Hansen’s J statistics for overall validity of the instruments. The 
null hypothesis of the F-test, which indicates if excluded instruments are related to the 
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instrumented variable, is that the instruments do not explain any cross-country variation 
in the aid regression in Equation (2). The rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock 
(1997) requires that the F-statistics should be higher than 10. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis of the overidentifying test (Hansen test) is the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term in the main structural model (Equation 1). A rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates the instruments pass the test. 
 
Incorporating Pro-Poor Public Expenditure 
As discussed in the literature review section, aid can affect welfare through 
different channels. A notable channel is the effect of aid on the composition of pro-poor 
public expenditure (PPE). In order to take into account this channel of transmission, we 
incorporate PPE into Equation (1), and estimate: 𝑊!" = 𝛳! + 𝛳!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" + 𝛳!𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" + 𝛳!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!"                                                           +𝛳!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!"+𝛳!𝑃𝑃𝐸!" + 𝛾!!" + 𝜀!!"        (4) 
 
Based on the literature on pro-poor expenditure, pro-poor spending can include 
different categories of government expenditure. We follow Pettersson (2007a, 2007b) in 
determining the composition of our PPE variable. PPE is the sum of expenditure on three 
social sectors: education, health, and housing and amenities. Since part of foreign aid is 
actually used to finance the government’s PPE, there can be double counting in the 
amount of aid in Equation (4). For that reason, we follow the method proposed by 
Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, et al. (2005) in removing the aid component from PPE. By 
replicating their method, PPE index is constructed as a function of income, foreign aid, 
and other government revenue. The equation for PPE is as follows: 𝑃𝑃𝐸!" = 𝜔! + 𝜔!𝐺𝐷𝑃!" + 𝜔!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" + 𝜔!𝑇𝑅!" + 𝜀!!"                                               (5)                                                                                          
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Where PPE is pro-poor public expenditure, GDP is gross domestic product per 
capita, Aid is foreign assistance as a percentage of GDP, and TR is government tax 
revenue. All variables are in logarithmic form. As laid out in the process, we calculate 
residual of Equation (5) and derive “PPEresid”. PPEresid represents government’s pro-
poor public expenditure that is not financed by foreign aid. Some may argue that aid 
directed to finance pro-poor public expenditure can be fungible since it can be diverted to 
finance unproductive expenditure instead (Asiama & Quartey, 2009). For the purpose of 
the study, we assume no fungibility. We thus follow Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, et al. 
(2005) and ensure only that aid is not double counted in the estimations. 
After constructing the residual regressor, the marginal effect of aid on welfare 
indicators conditional on institutions is represented in a model below: 𝑊!" = Ф! +Ф!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" +Ф!𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" +   Ф!𝐴𝑖𝑑!" ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠!" +Ф!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!" +Ф!𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑!" + 𝛾!!" + 𝜀!!"                                                                      (6) 
 
From Equation (6), any potential effects of aid on human welfare that come 
through PPE are now controlled for.  
This study conducts an analysis of a panel data for a sample of 80 countries over 
the period from 1980 to 2004. We follow Rajan and Subramanian (2008) in selecting 
countries to be included in the analysis through the selection criterion that is based 
primarily on historical aid receipts. Regardless of its current economic status, a country is 
included in this study as long as it received development assistance at least once during 
our time span. By including any country that was once an aid recipient, the study avoids 
the issue of sample selection biases that can occur if a country developed and no longer is 
an aid recipient. Appendix F provides a list of countries included in our sample. Since not 
all variables are available for all countries in all time periods, the number of total 
observations is noticeably smaller. Furthermore, due to limited data availability to 
construct PPE index, we expect a substantial reduction in the number of observations, 
when we include PPE into the models. Following many previous aid and welfare studies, 
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this research considers a non-overlapping five-year period in the analysis (for similar 
method, see(Dreher et al., 2008a; Williamson, 2008). Grouping the time into period 
analysis allows us to take into account the fluctuations of business cycle and 
measurement error (Boone, 1996). 
 
Dependent Variables 
The study utilizes various indicators of human welfare as dependent variables. 
The main welfare indicator is the Human Development Index (HDI). HDI is the 
composite of three components: the health index, the education index, and income as 
measured by real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity. The final component of 
HDI, i.e. income, is intended to capture the standard of living in a given country; 
however, we do not examine the income component in this study1. Health index or life 
expectancy is a measure of longevity demonstrating the ability of the population to lead a 
long and healthy life. In addition to health index, the study also uses infant mortality as 
another indicator of health outcome, mainly because of its rich data availability which 
made it a popular indicator for human welfare beside life expectancy and education 
(Feeny & Rogers, 2008). Infant mortality measures the number of infant dying before 
reaching the age of one year-old per 1,000 live births. On the other hand, education index 
measures overall educational attainment or knowledge acquisition of the total population 
(UNDP, 2012a)2. Education index comprises of two components—total adult literacy rate 
and gross enrollment rate. In addition to using education index, we use average years of 
schooling in the population over the age of 15 as another indicator of educational 
attainment. 
In short, we have five separate dependent variables: those including the HDI, the 
health index, the infant mortality rate, the education index, and the average schooling 
years. This study chooses the five indicators based on how common the measures are in 
the literature and also on data availability. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The income component of HDI is not examined in this study because “income” is considered as monetary 
welfare.   
2 For details on how to calculate HDI, health index, and education index, see, UNDP (2012a).	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Main Independent and Other Control Variables 
The main independent variable is aid defined as the net Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) received as a percentage of GDP. We also disaggregate aid by 
sector—health and education aid—and by source—bilateral and multilateral aid. Another 
main variable is institutions comprising of three commonly used institutional measures: 
corruption in government, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. To get a more precise 
estimate of the interaction term between Aid and Institutions in Equation (1), we follow a 
large number of aid studies and construct an institutional index using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the first eigenvalue from the three variables. We 
use PCA because it produces better weights compared to a simple average method, and it 
can also account for as much of the variances of the three institutional dimensions. 
Other control variables include initial welfare level, GDP per capita, and total 
population. We introduce welfare levels from previous time periods and GDP per capita 
into the model to capture the country’s initial welfare status and its economic 
development. Especially in the context of social sector aid, a country’s economic status 
represents largely its absorptive capacity to benefit from aid. Richer countries with better 
established infrastructure, for instance, can anticipate higher aid impact because its 
infrastructure enables higher access to the provision of health and education services. 
Also, we control for total population because countries with higher population requires 
higher resources to have the same impact as those with smaller population. GDP per 
capita (constant 2000 US$) is calculated as gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population, and population is total population.	  
 
Data Sources 
Data on the HDI, the health index, and the education index are obtained from 
UNDP’s International Human Development Indicators online database (UNDP, 2012b). 
Another education variable, average years of schooling in total population, is from Barro 
and Lee (2000), and the data on government public expenditure by social sectors (PPE) is 
from Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM of the International Monetary Fund (2010). 
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With respect to our aid data, we use Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) 
database of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2012b). However, we have to resort to using OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) 
Aid Activities database (OECD, 2012a) to extract aid by type and by source. Since this 
later database reports only the commitment amount, we have to make an assumption that 
the committed amount is 100% disbursed and is disbursed in the same year that the 
commitment is made (for similar assumption, see(Brown, 2012). We obtain the three 
institutional variables from the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 2008). 
The rest of the variables are from World Development Indicator CD-ROM (World Bank, 
2010). See Appendix G for variable descriptions and sources. 
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for all variables, based on a five-year 
averaged, whereas Table 3.2 shows variable correlations. Table 3.1 shows that the mean 
value of HDI in our sample is 0.52, on a scale of 0 to 1, with minimum and maximum 
values of 0.17 and 0.83, respectively. The former corresponds to HDI of Mali during the 
1980s, and the later corresponds to that of Republic of Korea in early 2000s. Sierra Leone 
(in the 1980s) and Republic of Yemen (in the 1990s) have the lowest health index of .27 
and lowest education index of 0.03, respectively, whereas Hong Kong and Republic of 
Korea in the early 2000s have the highest indices. With respect to infant mortality rate, 
the average infant death rate in our sample is about 61 deaths per 1,000 live births3. 
Mozambique has the highest infant death rate of 173 deaths in the 1980s, whereas Cyprus 
has the lowest rate of about 5 deaths per the same live births during 2000s. The average 
aid in our sample is 5.81% of GDP, with the minimum value of -0.03% in Trinidad and 
Tobago, indicating that the country’s loan repayment is higher than its aid receipt. 
Table 3.2, on the other hand, shows that countries receiving higher aid as a 
percentage of GDP, including by type and by source, tend to have lower human welfare 
as shown through negative correlation between aid and human development indicators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the average infant death rate is falling from an 
estimated 61 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 37 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2011 globally. The 
rate is higher for developing countries and more prevalent in the African region where progress has been 
slow (World Health Organization, 2013). 
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and positive correlation between aid and infant mortality rate. Nonetheless, the strength 
of the relationships is not considered strong (around 0.3 and 0.5). Since health index and 
education index are two of the three composites of HDI, the indices are very highly 
correlated with HDI. The other two dependent variables, infant mortality rate and average 
schooling years, are also highly correlated with health index and education index, 
respectively, as expected. As Table 3.2 further illustrates, aid and institutional 
variables—corruption rating, the rule of law, and quality of bureaucracy—are negatively 
and weakly related. Corruption, the rule of law, and bureaucratic quality are positively 
correlated with each other, but the relationships are not strong (around 0.4 or 0.5). 
Cronbach’s alpha for the three institutional variables is 0.729. Similarly, pro-poor public 
expenditure has weak but positive relationships with all human welfare indicators, except 
infant mortality rate. On instrumental variables, seven countries in our sample are in 
Franc zone; those include: Mali, Niger, Togo, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, and 
Republic of Congo. Five countries are Central American Countries: El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 
 
3.4 Results 
We start our analysis with Table 3.3 illustrating the results of the impact of 
aggregate aid and institutions on human development. In our main hypothesis, we believe 
that aid effectiveness differs by recipient countries’ institutional quality. In our model, we 
test this hypothesis by interacting aid with institutions. For each welfare indicator, the 
estimates are shown in both OLS and 2SLS in four columns. The first and third columns 
under each indicator (Column 1 and 3) present the results from estimating a simple 
version of Equation (1)—one that does not include the interactive variable—whereas the 
second and fourth columns (Column 2 and 4) present the main findings of the hypothesis 
of the interplay between aid and institutions. 
Under the OLS estimation technique, from which we can observe the patterns in 
the data, the coefficients on Aid in the model without the interaction term are positively 
related to HDI and health index, and negatively related to infant mortality rate, education 
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index, and average years of schooling (Column 1 in Table 3.3). None of the coefficients, 
though, is statistically significant, except in infant mortality regression. This finding 
suggests that the infant mortality rate decreases as aid increases. Similarly, none of the 
coefficients on Institutions is significant, except that in HDI regression where institutions 
are positive and significant at the 1% level. Here, we introduce the interaction of aid and 
institutions to the model in OLS (Column 2 in Table 3.3). The coefficient on the 
interactive term is positively and significantly different from zero, only in “average of 
schooling years” regression, suggesting that aid contributes more to improving the 
average years of schooling in countries with better institutional quality (Column 2 under 
Average Schooling Years in Table 3.3). However, the coefficient is significant at only the 
5% level. 
As we move to 2SLS estimation, the results in these columns change the whole 
picture of the estimations, especially with respect to the significance of coefficients 
(Column 3 and 4 in Table 3.3). Under Column 3 in Table 3.3, where no interaction term 
is included, aid has a consistently positive effect on welfare by increasing all welfare 
indicators, except infant mortality. The coefficients are all significantly different from 
zero, except that of the education index. Among the significant coefficients, only that of 
average schooling years is significant at the 5% level, the rest are highly significant at the 
1% level. As mentioned in the methodology section, we utilize two statistical tests: the 
Hansen J’s statistics and the F-statistics from first-stage regression. These tests allow us 
to determine if our results pass the overidentification restriction and the relevance tests, 
respectively. Out of five regressions above, only three have p-values of the Hansen tests 
above conventional rejection level. This suggests that the test of overidentifying 
restrictions cannot reject its null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term in three cases (i.e. HDI, infant mortality, and average 
schooling years). On the other hand, when we examine the F-statistics from first-stage 
regression, none of our models has F-statistics higher than the rule of thumb of 10. For 
that reason, we have to interpret the results with caution. 
Thus, with some reservations, we draw from the results that an increase in aid (as 
a percentage of GDP) increases health index, average schooling years, and reduces infant 
84	  
	  
mortality rate, resulting in overall increase of human development index (HDI). The 
magnitude of the effects is very small, though. A one percentage point increase in the 
share of aid to GDP increases HDI by approximately 0.052 percentage point, that is, the 
estimated elasticity of HDI is 0.052. The effect is about the same for health index, where 
the estimated elastic is 0.059. On infant mortality rate, the negative coefficient on Aid of  
-0.239 suggests that a one percentage point increase in aid to GDP reduces in infant 
mortality rate by about 0.239 percentage point. For a more practical example, we 
examine the effect in a country with infant mortality rate of 53 deaths per 1,000 live 
births, which is the median rate in our sample. In that particular country, a ten percentage 
point increase in the share of aid to GDP reduces infant mortality by about 1 death (2.39% 
* 53). The result also indicates that aid has a positive effect on average schooling years—
a one percentage point increase in aid to GDP at the margin is associated with roughly 
0.14 percentage point more schooling years. The magnitude of the impact of aid on these 
welfare indicators is minimal, which is in line with many previous studies that find 
positive but small relationship.  
Examining the results from an institutional standpoint, the variable Institutions is 
positively and significantly different from zero only in HDI regression, indicating that 
improvement in quality of institutions leads to higher human development. The result is 
as what we expected. Despite meeting our expectations, the coefficients on Institutions 
for other indicators are somewhat mixed and none of them are significant. 
Turning to other regressors, Table 3.3 illustrates that the initial level of welfare 
consistently and positively determines the level of welfare in the subsequent period. The 
other two control variables—GDP per capita and population—have positive effects as 
expected. For the most part, these two variables are highly statistically significant. In 
particular, higher GDP per capita is associated with higher human welfare (positive signs 
in all regressions, but infant mortality). As an example, a one percentage point increase in 
GDP per capita leads to a reduction in infant mortality rate by 0.186 percentage point 
(Table 3.3, Column 1 under Infant mortality). For a more precise example, we consider a 
country with GDP per capita of $1,180 and an infant mortality rate of 53 deaths per 1,000 
live births, both of which are the median values in our sample. A ten percentage point 
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increase in the country’s GDP per capita of approximately $118 is associated with a 
decrease in infant mortality rate of about 1 death (1.86% * 53), ceteris paribus. A country 
with median GDP per capita might not have the median infant mortality rate, but the 
example can trigger a comparison of the effect of GDP per capita on infant mortality and 
that of aid on the same indicator. 
As we move to the second column of 2SLS, where we test the main hypothesis of 
the interactive effect of aid and institutions, the signs on Aid remain positive in all 
regressions, but that of infant mortality. On the other hand, our variable of interest, 
Aid*Institutions, is statistically significant only in HDI regression with a surprisingly 
negative sign, suggesting that the marginal effectiveness of aid on HDI appears smaller 
for those countries with better institutional quality. This result contradicts our hypothesis, 
but resonates the finding in a study of the relationship between corruption and health aid 
by Dietrich (2011), who finds that, for strategic compliance purposes, countries with 
higher level of corruption use health aid more effectively. The core argument in Dietrich 
(2011) is that corrupt recipient governments compare the difference between the aid 
funded sectors looking for those with the lowest compliance costs, i.e. leverage from 
corruption is small. From their observations, they choose to comply with donors’ 
objectives only in sectors where compliance cost is cheap and outcomes are easily 
monitored. They do so simply to signal their willingness and ability to manage aid 
effectively so as to be awarded with more aid. 
The argument seems to be valid for our case in the health and education sectors, 
in where compliance cost is normally cheaper, say than infrastructure or energy where 
corruption can be much more lucrative. In particular, bribe collecting from infrastructure 
projects such as the building of an airport or irrigation systems can be more substantial 
than from stealing from textbooks or typical medical supplies. Furthermore, the results 
are contrary to our hypothesis also because of the nature of health and education aid. Aid 
supporting human development, specifically health aid as Dietrich (2011) notes, are often 
small scale projects implemented by recipient governments in collaboration with other 
NGOs or even other multinational donors, allowing for less chances for rent-seeking as 
compared with other sectors. In our results though, the interactive term is significant only 
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at the 5% level. The coefficients on Aid*Institutions in other regressions appear to have 
the right signs supporting strategic compliance argument, but none are significant. 
We also examine the effectiveness of aid using lagged value of aid and 
institutions. Specifically, it is possible that the effect of aid on welfare is not 
contemporaneous, but lagged. Since all our variables are in five-year average, we 
examine the effect using a one-period lagged value. We present the results from the 
estimation in Appendix H. The results show that an increase in aid increases HDI and 
decreases infant mortality rate. The coefficients are highly significant at the 1% level. 
However, aid seems to have no impact on education sector as we could only detect weak, 
yet positive, effects of aid on education index, and not on average schooling years. Also, 
none of the interactive variables, Lagged Aid*Institutions, is statistically significant, 
except that in average schooling years. The results from the lagged effects are somewhat 
similar to those produced by OLS estimation using contemporaneous values in Table 3.3. 
Since our institutional index comprises of three components: corruption, 
bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law, we also examine the effects of each underlying 
component separately. We present the results in Appendix I. Overall, the main findings in 
Table 3.3 using 2SLS hold finds that: Aid improves human development, and countries 
with poorer institutions (particularly, those with higher corruption and lower bureaucratic 
quality) tend to comply more with donors’ objectives. Interestingly, Appendix I shows no 
evidence of the relationship between corruption and human development, which is in 
contrast to most findings in previous studies (Panel A, Column 1 under HDI). On the 
other hand, better bureaucratic quality and stronger rule of law are associated with higher 
human welfare, which is in line with the findings in Kaufmann et al. (1999) (Panel B and 
C, Column 1 under HDI). 
Furthermore, we estimate a model of individual effect of institutions (without 
constructing an index), where all three institutional variables enter a regression at once. 
Also, each institutional variable is interacted with aid simultaneously. The results are 
shown in Appendix J. As Appendix J illustrates, aid is effective in improving all welfare 
outcomes where the coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level (Column 1 in 
Appendix J). From an institutional standpoint, however, the signs of coefficients on 
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institutional variables are mixed. Additionally, the coefficients are statistically significant 
only in a few cases: Corruption control in average years of schooling regression, 
Bureaucratic quality in education index and average years of schooling regressions, and 
Rule of law in HDI regression. When the interactive terms enter the models, the 
coefficient on Aid*Corruption Control is negatively and significantly different from zero 
at the 10% only in HDI regression, which is in line with our main findings in Table. 3.3. 
In contrast, the other variable of interest, Aid*Rule of law, is positively and significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level in education index and average years of schooling 
regressions, indicating that aid is more effective in improving education outcomes in 
countries with better rule of law. We also check the joint F test that the three institutional 
variables are zero. The p-values for the joint test are significant only for HDI and 
education index, in which they are significant at the 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
The results using the above individual institutional variables seem to vary 
depending on the effect of individual institutional variable on each welfare outcome. For 
the rest of our analysis, we utilize the index of institutions constructed using the Principal 
Component Analysis and 2SLS estimation technique. 
To better gauge the effect of aid and institutions on human welfare in recipient 
countries, we disaggregate aid into health and education aid and present the results in 
Table 3.4. As Column 1 in Table 3.4 shows, health aid appears to be very important in 
improving health index and reducing infant mortality rate, whereas education aid does 
not appear to have the same result. The coefficients on health aid in both regressions are 
highly significant at the 1% level. Also, both F-statistics and Hansen’s J statistics 
improve noticeably when we disaggregate aid, giving us even higher confidence to 
conclude that health aid is indeed effective. Our results are in line with those from Mishra 
and Newhouse (2009), who too find a very minimal but positive impact of health aid. 
Comparing the magnitude of the effect in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, the coefficients on 
health aid are much smaller than those on aggregate aid, especially in infant mortality 
regression, indicating that other sectoral aid partly contributes to improvements in health 
outcomes. For instance, infrastructure aid for road construction also contributes to better 
health when it connects remote area to health centers. This may also be a reason why 
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studies such as Williamson (2008) and Wilson (2011) who examine specifically health 
aid effectiveness cannot detect any discernible impact of the assistance. 
Furthermore, Column 2 in Table 3.4 illustrates that none of the coefficients on the 
interactive term is significant, with the exception of that for health index. Like aggregate 
aid, health aid turns out to be more effective in increasing health index in poorer 
institutional settings. Again, this result goes against our hypothesis in support of 
Dietrich’s (2011) strategic compliance argument. In general, education aid seems to be 
ineffective.  
On welfare effect of aid by source, Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 present results of the 
impact for bilateral and multilateral aid, respectively. For better comparison, we also 
restrict the two samples to the same size. At the first glance, we see the same pattern of 
the effects as in aggregate aid. Both bilateral and multilateral aid lead to improvement in 
recipient countries’ quality of life as seen through an increase in HDI and health index, 
and a reduction in infant mortality. All coefficients are highly significant at the 1% level. 
The magnitude of the impact of bilateral aid on HDI is slightly higher than that of 
multilateral aid (0.0203 vs. 0.0148), while both have strikingly similar effects on health 
index and infant mortality. Contrary to the general perception thus, bilateral and 
multilateral aid affect recipient’s welfare at about the same degree. Also, consistent with 
the results from the main findings, bilateral and multilateral aid appear to be more 
effective in less favorable environment. 
Furthermore, comparing the magnitude of the interaction terms, we notice the 
coefficients on Bilateral aid*Institutions are slightly bigger than that on Multilateral 
aid*Institutions, indicating that recipient countries with poorer institutions are more 
likely to comply with bilateral donors than with multilateral ones. Christensen et al. 
(2011) may provide an explanation as to why this is the case. They notate that developing 
countries, who are also aid recipients, usually have sufficient voting power on the 
executive board of multilateral institutions, the results from which could affect policy 
decisions in multilateral institutions. Additionally, multilateral donors are constrained by 
their strong need to lend the money as if to justify their existence. Bilateral donors, on the 
other hand, are not bind by any institutional constraints, providing them the ability to 
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allocate their aid resources more strategically. Sometimes this allows them to bypassing 
various corrupt or poorly managed aid recipients. In that sense, bilateral donors have 
more advantage over multilateral ones in responding to recipients’ adverse selection. 
Alesina and Weder (2002) find that that bilateral donors, especially Scandinavian 
countries and Australia, give more aid to less corrupt recipients while multilateral donors 
do not differentiate between recipient types. As development cooperation between donors 
and recipients become more mature and recipient governments understand donors’ 
behavior and constraints, the governments with poor institutions are more likely to 
comply with the restrictions and limitations put forth by bilateral than multilateral donors. 
This explains the different magnitude, and even the significance, of coefficients on 
Bilateral aid*Institutions and Multilateral aid*Institutions in our study.  
As a final note about Table 3.5 and 3.6, the impact on the education sector is, as 
in previous cases, less prevalent—only bilateral aid slightly increases average years of 
schooling. This result supports the findings in Christensen et al. (2011) who agree that 
bilateral primary-education aid is effective in increasing primary school enrollment. Also, 
we note that the F-statistics from first stage regression are all well above the acceptable 
rule of thumb of 10, suggesting that our excluded instruments, which comprises mainly 
of strategic regions, are very good predictors of bilateral aid, supporting the widely 
known observation that bilateral donors care more about their strategic interests when 
allocating aid. 
Next, we move further in the analysis by incorporating the government’s pro-poor 
public expenditure (PPE). As mentioned in the methodology section, we follow Gomanee, 
Morrissey, Mosley, et al. (2005) and acknowledge that some part of PPE must be 
financed by foreign aid; hence, we take into this fact account by taking out the aid 
financed part. PPEresid represents the aid-free portion of PPE. Table 3.7 reports both the 
inclusion of PPE and PPEresid into our baseline models. Due to very limited expenditure 
data availability, the inclusion of the expenditure variable reduces the sample size by 
more than half. In this subsample, the mean values for GDP per capita, human welfare 
scores, and institutional scores, are all higher than in the full sample, while the mean 
value for aid is lower, suggesting that this subsample consists of relatively higher income 
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countries, who receive less aid on average, as compared to the full sample. For the 
purpose of comparing the results, we also limit the sample size for regressions without 
the expenditure variable and report the results in the first column. In this subsample, the 
impact of aid on human welfare remains positive despite losing some statistical 
significance in some cases. The coefficient on Aid in Education Index regression gains 
some small significance while it has never been significant in any previous cases. 
The second model in Table 3.7 controls for pro-poor public expenditure, PPE. 
The third model controls for the same expenditure with the only difference being that 
PPE is now the residual from the aid-financed component. We now focus only on the 
HDI regressions. In Table 3.7 under HDI, once pro-poor public expenditure, PPE, is 
taken into account, the coefficient on Aid loses some statistical significance from the 1% 
to the 5% level, but regains its significance when controlling for PPEresid (Column 2 
and 3). This suggests that the aid component in PPE also contributes to increasing HDI 
and that double counting indeed matters. However, since the Aid regressors are 
statistically significant in both cases (with PPE and PPEresid), we conclude that aid has 
a direct positive impact on HDI, i.e. not through PPE. Such impact may come from 
various aid projects, often implemented by NGOs, aiming to improve health and 
education outcomes at the grassroots level. The finding is consistent with that found in 
Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, et al. (2005), but not with Gomanee et al. (2003) or 
Pettersson (2007b). All these differences may be attributable to the sample chosen as 
discussed in the literature review. 
Equally important, both PPE and PPEresid are positively and statistically 
significant, suggesting that government pro-poor public expenditure also contributes to 
increasing the human development index. The results contradict most previous studies 
that do not find any association between public spending and welfare outcomes such as 
Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and McGuire (2006), but is in line with Gupta, Verhoeven, et 
al. (2002). Yet, the coefficients are significantly different from zero only at the 5% level, 
which is also similar to that in Gupta, Verhoeven, et al. (2002). 
The last column adds the interaction term, Aid*Institutions, to the model where 
the aid component is already separated from pro-poor public expenditure (Table 3.7, 
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Column 4 under HDI). This model examines whether aid works differently in different 
environments controlling for recipient government’s public expenditure. Unlike the result 
in our baseline model (Table 3.3), Aid*Institutions is not significant, indicating that for a 
given level of pro-poor public expenditure, the impact of aid on human development 
index does not differ by recipient’s institutional quality. Likewise, pro-poor public 
expenditure is no longer a significant determinant of human welfare index. The result 
seems to indicate that our previous findings on the main hypothesis are somewhat 
tenuous. 
Finally, we focus on the rest of the regressions in Table 3.7. As Column 2 and 
Column 3 of Table 3.7 report, aid remains positive and statistically significant in all 
regressions whether the models take into account PPE or PPEresid. Therefore, like in the 
case of human development index, aid contributes directly to increasing other welfare 
indicators. Nonetheless, government expenditure variables are not significant in all four 
cases. Also, in the last column (Column 4), Aid*Institutions are all insignificant, pointing 
to the same conclusion that aid does not work differently in different institutions when 
government public expenditure is taken into account. 
Overall, aid is effective in improving human welfare in recipient countries by 
increasing HDI, health index, and reducing infant mortality, though the effect is small, all 
of which is in line with most previous studies. However, the pattern is less consistent for 
education index and average years of schooling. Furthermore, the results do not support 
our main hypothesis arguing that aid given to countries with good institutions has more 
impact on improving recipient’s quality of life. Instead, recipient governments with poor 
institutions seem to comply more with donors’ objectives, resulting in higher human 
development outcomes. The compliancy is even more prevalent for bilateral aid. 
However, the result is not robust to controlling for pro-poor public expenditure. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This study uses data from 80 countries from 1980 to 2004 to extend the literature 
of the impact of aid on welfare by examining the effect under different institutional 
settings. Taking some caveats into account, our results resonate a consensus finding that 
aid works to improve human welfare in recipient countries; in particular, we find some 
convincing evidence of such effects on HDI and health sector, though not so much on the 
education sector. Nonetheless, those effects are very small. As we disaggregate aid into 
health and education aid, the effect of health aid on health outcomes is also more 
pronouncing than that of education aid on its outcomes. Additionally, the positive effect 
of aid on raising quality of life in recipient countries is dominated by its direct impact, 
most likely through institutions as NGOs whose work involve directly with the health and 
education sectors at the grassroots level. These results have important implications for 
enhancing the effectiveness of development assistance by placing more emphasis on aid 
efforts coming through agencies that work closely with the locals in recipient countries. 
On the main argument that centers on the interplay between aid and institutions, 
we do not find any indication of weak institutions being associated with lowering aid 
effectiveness. Instead, our results support the strategic compliance argument made by 
Dietrich (2011) who argues that corrupt leaders choose to comply with donors’ objectives 
in sectors where compliance cost is cheap and outcomes are easy to monitor. In our study, 
such compliance is in the health and education sectors. Furthermore, such strategic 
compliance is more prevalent for bilateral than multilateral aid. The results may be 
attributable to the fact that bilateral donors face less constraint in its aid allocation than 
multilateral donors, thus allowing them the ability to allocate their aid portfolio more 
selectively. Understanding the complex behavior of different donors, corrupt recipients 
may seek to comply more with bilateral than multilateral donors. The result suggests that 
the international donor community should pay more attention to quality of government in 
receiving countries, take firm action to any misuse and mismanagement of aid money, 
and be more selective when providing aid.	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CHAPTER 4	  
CONCLUSION	  
	  
	  
 
This dissertation examines empirically the impact of aid on income distribution 
and human welfare with the focus on the interplay between aid and institutions. We argue 
that recipient countries’ institutions play a major role in both the distribution of aid 
among different income groups and its effectiveness in improving human development. 
The dissertation studies the impacts in two separate essays.  
Essay 1 suggests that an increase in aid decreases the income shares of the poorest 
two quintiles and that the impact is not conditional on recipient’s institutions, which 
contradicts our initial hypothesis. Specifically, the income share of the poor shrinks with 
more aid not because bad institutions enable the elites to capture rents from aid, but rather 
because aid by itself is not designed for the poor. In addition to the rich’s higher ability to 
absorb aid resources, donors’ political and commercial interests, which appear to 
overshadow their altruistic motivations, also attribute to the findings in this study. 
Donor’s political interests (where donors use aid to buy supports from local elites 
prompting the distribution to shift away from the poor), and its commercial interests 
(where donors use aid to support businesses and jobs in donor countries through 
requirements of the use of donor firms or technical assistance), may explain the weak link 
of aid and institutions on income inequality. Furthermore, the requirement that aid money 
be spent on goods from donor countries also contributes to the shrinking income share of 
the poor. In particular, such requirement can hurt the poor producing the same goods 
locally.  
An important implication from these findings calls for more focus on donors’ own 
motives in aid allocation that by no means targets the poorer population. Many studies on 
aid and income distribution attribute their findings of increased inequality effect of aid to 
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rent-seeking behavior of elites in recipient countries. The conclusion of this study, 
however, is in line with the claim made by Herzer and Nunnenkamp (2012) who maintain 
that donors’ own incentive problems, rather than recipients’ institutions, have more to do 
with the inequality increasing effects. Therefore, to direct more aid toward the poor 
depends predominantly on donors’ willingness to change their own behavior. 
While Essay 1 paints a somewhat negative image of aid, Essay 2 finds a positive 
impact of aid in bettering human welfare in a recipient country. On average, aid increases 
human development, though small, and the increase appears to be driven more by health 
than education sector. Additionally, we find that in countries with poorer institutional 
quality aid is more effective in increasing human welfare; however, the results do not 
hold true when taking into account government’s pro-poor public expenditure. The result 
is partly consistent with the strategic compliance argument. The argument postulates that 
corrupt recipients would comply more with donors’ goals in sectors where they know the 
leverage is limited (e.g., health or education), but they would not do so in sectors where 
compliance costs are high (e.g., rural development or infrastructure). The empirical 
analysis also highlights the effects of bilateral and multilateral aid on different welfare 
outcomes. While the results suggest that both bilateral and multilateral aid have very 
similar effects on improving recipient welfare, corrupt recipients comply more with 
bilateral than with multilateral donors, most likely because bilateral donors have less 
constraints in their aid allocation. 
When combining the findings from both studies, we conclude that aid does 
increase human welfare in recipient countries, but the poor represented in our studies by 
the two lowest quintiles benefit the least from aid. In other words, aid may benefit 
recipient countries to an extent that people’ lives are improved, but the improvement does 
not necessarily occur among its poorer population, or if it does, it does not have any 
discernible average effect on the poor’s income. 
Returning to the aid debate between the two main camps—Sachs vs. Easterly—
this dissertation provides two distinct, yet related, issues that can build a case for both 
camps. If the benchmark measurement of aid effectiveness is based on the MDGs, the 
improvement in human development found in Essay 2 is clearly part of aid’s success, 
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justifying the current top-down approach Sachs promotes. Certainly, the world’s poor is 
characterized by high infant, child, and maternal mortality rates, widespread diseases 
such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS. If people’s lives do not justify moral 
obligation to help, nothing does. In contrast, the opponents of aid would argue that 
development aid is not humanitarian aid that exists only to keep people alive. Instead, its 
success should be measured against “sustainable economic growth and poverty 
alleviation” (Moyo, 2009, p. 150) . This argument comes not from Easterly per se, but 
from another aid opponent, Dambisa Moyo, who joins Easterly to make the case that aid 
does not work. Indeed, the results from Essay 1 somewhat support the anti-aid rhetoric 
from the Easterly and Moyo camp. Also, considering the colossal amount money spent 
thus far and the minimal outcomes that occur from the money provided, the practicality 
of bringing policy change to recipient countries looks somewhat pessimistic. 
Of course, reconciling between needs and effectiveness is not an easy task. On the 
one hand, Sachs seems to use recipient’s needs to call for more aid while the problem 
with aid is not about the amount but the very little oversight in how the money is spent 
and who the real beneficiaries are.	  The current aid practices, which often lack 
independent auditing and scrutiny from the public to hold either recipient governments or 
donors responsible, do in fact warrant only limited outcomes, while at the same time, 
provide minimal benefits to the most needy and vulnerable. Thus, more funding using the 
same system would only lead to additional waste of scarce resources. In that sense, aid 
proponents should shift their attention to searching for ways to make aid more beneficial 
to the genuine poor and to use it more effectively than simply calling for more of it. 
On the other hand, Easterly advocates for basic assistance by placing heavy 
emphasis on recipient countries’ own ability to lift themselves out of poverty through 
what he called Searchers. While Easterly seems to be cynical about the top-down 
approach, his idea is not very practical as he places much emphasis on the free-market. 
Specifically, the poor face many constraints and lack critical information to make 
informed decisions, thus leaving them to the market to do the job is not a smart option 
either. Therefore, both Sachs and Easterly are at the extreme ends when considering how 
to help the world’s poor. Banerjee and Duflo’s (2011) work, which tries to dig deeper 
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into understanding the poor’s behavior and constraints, may be more versatile and 
practical under different institutional settings. Empowering the less advantage and less 
powerful people to bring about incremental changes to the state of their institutions, their 
lives, seems to provide better guarantee that can lead to long term significant differences. 
Also, the poor can escape poverty only when they organize and come up with solutions to 
liberate themselves. After all, there is no easy formula to move from poverty to prosperity, 
but a consistent engagement between the grassroots people, recipient governments, and 
international community might bring about positive changes overtime. 
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Figure 2.1: Sector Allocation from 1990 to 2011 (percentage of total disbursement) 
Source: OECD (2012b) database and author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 2.2: Social Sector Sub-Allocation from 1990 to 2011 (in 2010 million dollars) 
 
Source: OECD (2012b) database.
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 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Gini 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
                  
Aid -0.155*** -0.158***  -0.086** -0.090***  -0.026 -0.031  0.004 -0.013  0.283** 0.315**  0.485*** 0.535*** 
 (-4.762) (-5.376)  (-2.529) (-2.689)  (-0.746) (-0.852)  (0.091) (-0.265)  (2.224) (2.438)  (3.179) (3.620) 
Institutions 0.017 0.007  -0.015 -0.008  -0.103 -0.058  -0.158 0.025  0.272 0.049  -0.094 -0.389 
 (0.208) (0.063)  (-0.159) (-0.069)  (-1.092) (-0.499)  (-1.505) (0.160)  (0.866) (0.121)  (-0.272) (-0.809) 
Aid*Institutions  0.003   -0.002   -0.014   -0.057*   0.071   0.091 
  (0.091)   (-0.079)   (-0.641)   (-1.798)   (0.868)   (0.827) 
                  
Observations 256 256  254 254  254 254  254 254  258 258  283 283 
F-stat. from first stage 17.79 -  17.80 -  17.80 -  17.80 -  18.06 -  19.75 - 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.155 0.208  0.114 0.0383  0.0558 0.113  0.0077 0.0132  0.0926 0.109  0.0633 0.0247 
 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Gini 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
                  
Aid -0.153*** -0.147***  -0.073** -0.067**  -0.014 -0.005  0.041 0.033  0.223** 0.212*  0.440*** 0.468*** 
 (-4.860) (-4.721)  (-2.324) (-2.086)  (-0.452) (-0.148)  (1.027) (0.815)  (2.036) (1.897)  (3.176) (3.230) 
Institutions 0.035 -0.072  0.048 -0.077  0.029 -0.065  0.006 0.053  -0.080 0.180  -0.329 -0.093 
 (0.388) (-0.524)  (0.510) (-0.574)  (0.322) (-0.547)  (0.056) (0.347)  (-0.252) (0.418)  (-0.901) (-0.161) 
Aid*Institutions  0.033   0.039   0.030   -0.015   -0.083   -0.074 
  (0.866)   (1.161)   (1.101)   (-0.487)   (-0.801)   (-0.477) 
                  
Observations 229 229  224 224  224 224  224 224  228 228  261 261 
F-stat. from first stage 14.33 -  14.24 -  14.24 -  14.24 -  14.53 -  16.70 - 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.144 0.534  0.0837 0.405  0.108 0.396  0.455 0.153  0.153 0.468  0.0635 0.164 
	  
 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Gini 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
                  
Aid -0.211*** -0.208***  -0.184*** -0.185**  -0.166*** -0.190**  -0.0807 -0.111*  0.655*** 0.712***  0.937*** 1.016*** 
 (-3.393) (-3.401)  (-2.739) (-2.426)  (-2.607) (-2.472)  (-1.425) (-1.946)  (3.125) (2.940)  (4.033) (4.081) 
Institutions 0.032 -0.020  -0.045 0.021  -0.057 0.233  -0.231* 0.099  0.280 -0.369  -0.002 -0.774 
 (0.227) (-0.067)  (-0.293) (0.069)  (-0.402) (0.868)  (-1.790) (0.437)  (0.576) (-0.391)  (-0.004) (-0.719) 
Aid*Institutions  0.011   -0.014   -0.058   -0.066*   0.129   0.150 
  (0.187)   (-0.255)   (-1.366)   (-1.782)   (0.819)   (0.770) 
                  
Observations 134 134  132 132  132 132  132 132  132 132  149 149 
F-stat. from first stage 12.60 -  12.69 -  12.69 -  12.69 -  12.69 -  16.21 - 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.0648 0.0827  0.0701 0.0705  0.116 0.242  0.330 0.658  0.0925 0.203  0.0477 0.0964 
	  
 Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5  Gini 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
                  
Aid -0.165*** -0.173***  -0.132** -0.136**  -0.099** -0.102**  -0.033 -0.047  0.445*** 0.474***  0.633*** 0.672*** 
 (-3.506) (-3.287)  (-2.572) (-2.462)  (-2.133) (-2.164)  (-0.828) (-1.236)  (2.666) (2.779)  (3.144) (3.104) 
Institutions 0.040 -0.177  0.060 -0.078  0.004 -0.012  -0.164 -0.013  0.088 0.297  0.283 0.661 
 (0.236) (-0.819)  (0.335) (-0.341)  (0.025) (-0.060)  (-0.821) (-0.070)  (0.142) (0.428)  (0.392) (0.780) 
Aid*Institutions  0.039   0.025   0.003   -0.029   -0.037   -0.069 
  (0.985)   (0.700)   (0.096)   (-1.388)   (-0.342)   (-0.457) 
                  
Observations 114 114  114 114  114 114  114 114  115 115  123 123 
F-stat. from first stage 10.32 -  10.21 -  10.21 -  10.21 -  10.38 -  11.21 - 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.0762 0.458  0.0961 0.267  0.329 0.549  0.371 0.209  0.261 0.447  0.243 0.483 
	  
Table 2.5: Robustness to Sample Restrictions 
Panel A: Survey quality better than 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Q5 less than 60% 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Aid higher than 1%, lower than 30% 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Low and lower-middle income countries only 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Exogenous 
instruments for aid include: log of total population, Franc zone, Central American countries, and Egypt dummies. All 
control variables and period dummies are included in all regressions, but not reported. 
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Appendix A: Countries Included in the Analysis in Essay 1 
 
Low Income Lower Middle 
Income 
Upper Middle 
Income 
High Income 
    
Ethiopia Bolivia Algeria Israel 
Gambia Cameroon Argentina Korea, Rep. 
Haiti Cote d'Ivoire Botswana Slovenia 
Kenya Egypt Brazil Trinidad and Tobago 
Madagascar El Salvador Chile Bahamas 
Malawi Ghana Colombia Croatia 
Mali Guatemala Costa Rica Cyprus 
Niger Guyana Dominican Republic Hong Kong SAR, China 
Sierra Leone Honduras Ecuador Malta 
Tanzania India Gabon Singapore 
Zimbabwe Indonesia Jamaica  
Bangladesh Morocco Malaysia  
Burkina Faso Nicaragua Mexico  
Guinea Nigeria Peru  
Guinea-Bissau Pakistan Thailand  
Liberia Paraguay Tunisia  
Mozambique Philippines Turkey  
Uganda Senegal Uruguay  
 Sri Lanka Venezuela  
 Zambia Albania  
 Armenia Azerbaijan  
 Iraq China  
 Moldova Iran  
 Mongolia Jordan  
 Papua New Guinea Namibia  
 Sudan Panama  
 Vietnam South Africa  
 Yemen Suriname  
  Kazakhstan  
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 Appendix B: Variable Descriptions and Sources for Essay 1 
 
Variable Description Source 
   
Q1-Q5 Income share captured by each fifth of 
the population ordered according to 
the size of their incomes. Expressed 
as percentage of total income. 
UNU/WIDER (2008) 
Gini coefficient Income inequality given as a 
percentage. 
UNU/WIDER (2008) 
Aid  Net Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) disbursement in current units 
as a share of GDP in current units. 
OECD (2012b) and    
World Bank (2010) 
Tied aid Sectoral aid commitment in current 
units as a share of GDP in current 
units. 
OECD (2012a) and    
World Bank (2010) 
Untied aid Non-sectoral aid commitment in 
current units as a share of GDP in 
current units. 
OECD (2012a) and    
World Bank (2010) 
Corruption Corruption index, ranging from 0 to 6. 
Higher rating reflects lower 
corruption.  
PRS Group (2008) 
Rule of law Rule of law index, ranging from 0 to 
6. Higher rating corresponds to better 
quality of the rule of law. 
PRS Group (2008) 
Bureaucracy Bureaucratic quality index, ranging 
from 0 to 4. Higher rating corresponds 
to better quality of bureaucracy.  
PRS Group (2008) 
Population Total population World Bank (2010) 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population, in constant 2000 
U.S. dollars. 
World Bank (2010) 
Rural population 
(%total) 
People living in rural areas as a 
percentage of total population. 
World Bank (2010) 
Inflation rate Inflation rate based on annual 
percentage change in the consumer 
price index. 
World Bank (2010) 
Openness Sum of exports and imports of goods 
and services as a percentage of GDP. 
World Bank (2010) and  
Author’s Calculation 
Average schooling 
years 
Average years of schooling in the 
total population aged 15 and over. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
Survey type Conceptual measurement of each 
quintile and Gini coefficient, 1 being 
consumption-based and 0 being 
income-based. 
UNU/WIDER (2008) 
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Appendix F: Countries Included in the Analysis in Essay 2 
 
Low Income Lower Middle 
Income 
Upper Middle 
Income 
High Income 
    
Gambia Bolivia Algeria Trinidad and Tobago 
Haiti Cameroon Argentina Bahrain 
Kenya Cote d'Ivoire Botswana Brunei Darussalam 
Malawi Egypt Brazil Croatia 
Mali El Salvador Chile Cyprus 
Niger Ghana Colombia Hong Kong SAR, China 
Sierra Leone Guatemala Costa Rica Korea, Rep. 
Tanzania Guyana Dominican Republic Malta 
Togo Honduras Ecuador Saudi Arabia 
Zimbabwe India Gabon United Arab Emirates 
Bangladesh Indonesia Jamaica  
Congo, Dem. Rep. Morocco Malaysia  
Liberia Nicaragua Mexico  
Mozambique Pakistan Peru  
Uganda Paraguay Thailand  
 Philippines Tunisia  
 Senegal Turkey  
 Sri Lanka Uruguay  
 Syria Venezuela  
 Zambia Albania  
 Armenia China  
 Congo, Rep. Iran  
 Moldova Jordan  
 Mongolia Namibia  
 Papua New Guinea Panama  
 Sudan South Africa  
 Vietnam Kazakhstan  
 Yemen   
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Appendix G: Variable Descriptions and Sources for Essay 2 
 
Variable Description Source 
   
HDI A composite of three components: health 
index, education index, and income (0-1). 
UNDP (2012b) 
Health index A measure of longevity which demonstrates 
the ability of the population to lead a long and 
healthy life (0-1). 
UNDP (2012b) 
Education Index A measure of overall educational attainment 
or knowledge acquisition of the total 
population (0-1). 
UNDP (2012b) 
Infant mortality Number of infant dying before reaching the 
age of one year-old per 1,000 live births. 
World Bank (2010) 
Average schooling 
years 
Average years of schooling in the total 
population aged 15 and over. 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
Aid  Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
disbursement in current units as a share of 
GDP in current units. 
OECD (2012b) and 
World Bank (2010) 
Education aid Education aid commitment in current units as 
a share of GDP in current units. 
OECD (2012a) and 
World Bank (2010) 
Health aid Health aid commitment in current units as a 
share of GDP in current units. 
OECD (2012a) and 
World Bank (2010) 
Multilateral aid Multilateral aid commitment in current units 
as a share of GDP in current units. 
OECD (2012a) and 
World Bank (2010) 
Bilateral aid Bilateral aid commitment in current units as a 
share of GDP in current units. 
OECD (2012a) and 
World Bank (2010) 
Corruption Corruption index (0-6). Higher rating reflects 
lower corruption.  
PRS Group (2008) 
Rule of law Rule of law index (0-6). Higher rating reflects 
better quality of the rule of law. 
PRS Group (2008) 
Bureaucracy Bureaucratic quality index (0-4). Higher 
rating reflects better quality of bureaucracy.  
PRS Group (2008) 
PPE Sum of expenditure on education, health, and 
housing and amenities (% of GDP).	  
IMF (2010) 
Tax revenue Tax revenue (% of GDP) IMF (2010)  
Population Total population World Bank (2010) 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population (constant 2000 USD). 
World Bank (2010) 
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